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ABSTRACT

A study unit for an Open University course on the structure and administration of higher education in Great Britain is intended to complement a textbook and to provide over 10 hours of study. The instructional objectives for the unit include: (1) an understanding of the recent evolution of the higher education system in the United Kingdom, especially England and Wales; (2) an understanding of the perceived strengths and possible weaknesses of the University Grants Committee mechanism of public funding for universities; (3) knowledge of the arguments advanced on opposing sides about the organization, management, and funding of the public sector of higher education, including teacher education; (4) an understanding of the relationship between external control and financing of institutions and their external governance structure; and (5) an understanding of how policy-making for British higher education has proceeded by discrete steps and without reference to any immutable and universally accepted principles. Appended are author's comments on the suggested activities for the unit, an extract from the 1978 Oakes Report concerning management of public higher education, and a bibliography. (MSE)

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THE OPEN UNIVERSITY

Educational Studies: A Second Level Course
E222 The Control of Education in Britain

Unit 13
Higher Education

Prepared for the Course Team by Gerald Fowler

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

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Objectives

When you have completed this unit, you should:

(a) understand the recent evolution of the system of higher education in the United Kingdom, and above all in England and Wales;

(b) be able to give an account of the perceived strengths and possible weaknesses of the University Grants Committee mechanism for public funding of the universities;

(c) know what are the arguments advanced by the protagonists of opposing views about the organization, management and funding of the 'public sector' of higher education, including teacher education;

(d) have a clear view of the relationship between the external control and financing of institutions of higher education, and their external structure of government;

(e) understand how policy-making for British higher education has proceeded by discrete steps, without reference to any immutable and universally accepted principles.

Notes on studying Unit 13

This unit offers an analysis of the development of policy for higher education over the past twenty and more years. This has been largely separated from policy-making for other areas of the education system. The unit therefore stands on its own, save that it relates to the general control of the system set out in Unit 2, and overlaps with the treatment of some economic aspects of policy-making in Units 7 and 8.

No one should underestimate the importance of higher education within the total public education system. It accounts for at least one-sixth of expenditure on education, whether that be right or wrong. That is to say, it consumes resources which might be otherwise available to other sectors of the system. Further, academic requirements set in higher education in part determine what is practicable in the schools and in non-advanced further education.

In this unit we have made use of the set book for the course, Regan's account of *Local Government and Education*, relying on chapters IX and X. We do not stand by every word in those chapters, but they are a good guide to policy in the public sector of education, i.e. the non-university colleges. They do not help us with what has happened and is happening in the universities, which we treat quite separately.

We seek to treat the overall composition of the higher education sector: teacher education and its reorganization; the 'public sector', or 'advanced further education', and the recent history of its development; the universities. This is an almost impossible task in a single unit, and we seek the indulgence of both the student who knows some part of this in detail already, and of the one who knows nothing and finds the unit inadequately detailed. Both could not be satisfied simultaneously.

SET READING

Set reading in connection with the main text of Unit 13 consists of two chapters from the set book for the course:

Regan, D. E. (1977) *Local Government and Education*, London, George Allen and Unwin, chapters IX and X.

In addition, students are required to read the summary of recommendations in the 1978 Oakes Report on the management of higher education in local education authority colleges, which we print as Appendix 2 to this unit:

Department of Education and Science (1978) *Report of the Working Group on the Management of Higher Education in the Maintained Sector*, Cmnd 7130, London, HMSO, (The Oakes Report) pp. 54–60.

TIMING

Unit 13 and related course material is intended to provide students with about 10½ hours of study. You will see that the Activities have been listed as separate items from the main text, of which they are of course an integral part. This is so that you can see at a glance how long you might be expected to give to the questions themselves. The time spent on reading that part of the main text or any set reading which relate to the Activities is included in the time estimates for them.

Time schedule	*hrs*	*mins*
Main text	7	25
Activities (including reading Regan, chapter IX)	1	50
Other readings:		
Regan, chapter X		20*
The Oakes Report recommendations		25
Total	10	00

*Students should have read this chapter in connection with Unit 12 of the course. Hence the time allocation is intended to take account only of the need for reference and revision.

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• Places in which there are university institutions

□ polytechnics

△ Scottish central institutions

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Both the university and the polytechnic sector expanded in the 1960s.

1 What is higher education?

THE DEFINITION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

1.1 The term 'higher education' has no specific legal meaning defined in an Act of Parliament.[1] However, it is used informally to refer to courses the terminal point of which is more advanced than GCE Advanced Level or the Scottish Higher Leaving Certificate. One may argue that a distinction is also drawn in terms of the educational achievement required to *start* a course. But this is impossible to define. Thus, the certificate of education (teacher's certificate) had a theoretical entry requirement of only five GCE 'O' levels, well below the standard required of an entrant to a Higher National Diploma or Certificate—where the terminal standard would be deemed by many academic bodies (including the Open University) to be lower than that of the first qualification. A degree course at a university has *no* formally defined entry standard; since the Education Act 1975, any student admitted to such a course is entitled to a student award, *irrespective* of prior educational achievement. The (theoretical) terminal standard of a course is, therefore, the only easily understood criterion of what shall constitute higher education.

1.2 This definition has some element of imprecision about it. For example, GCE Advanced Level and the Scottish Higher Leaving Certificate are arguably themselves not at exactly the same level of academic or educational achievement. The former is usually taken in fewer subjects than the latter, but the degree of knowledge required in each of the subjects taken is somewhat greater. It is difficult to estimate the terminal level of a course which has no final examination. Thus, many courses run by university extra-mural departments may be of a level and a degree of sophistication that is higher than that of GCE 'A' level, but there is no terminal examination; however, normally we should classify such courses as forming part of 'adult education', itself not clearly defined, and because such courses are not usually vocationally oriented, their value in subsequent employment may be little (see Unit 14). But there can be occasional dispute about the level of a course which does end in an examination and a qualification.

1.3 Such rare disputes will occur only in respect of courses at further education (FE) colleges. No British university offers full-time courses at other than higher education level. In FE, however, courses are offered which range from GCE 'O' level and initial vocational preparation courses at one extreme, to degree and postgraduate courses at the other (see Unit 12). Because all courses are graded into one of five categories of work, and this grading affects indirectly the staffing of a college and the average level of remuneration received by the staff, it is of some significance whether a course is deemed to be 'advanced', i.e. of higher education level. The vast majority of courses offered by colleges of further education, however, are those leading to recognized national qualifications, and here there will be no dispute about the grading of the course, which is agreed nationally. It is only in respect of those relatively few courses that are originated by the college itself and lead to a college-validated qualification where dispute may arise. Such issues will normally be settled by the Regional Staff Inspector in the name of the Secretary of State.[2] The definition of 'higher education' given above is thus workable, even if not watertight.

[1] From 1902 to 1944 there was a statutory meaning of the term—but it meant (broadly) what we now call 'secondary education'.

[2] An 'advanced' course is not necessarily 'poolable': for this term, see section 3.

THE INSTITUTIONAL PATTERN OF HIGHER EDUCATION

1.4 Higher education courses are offered by a variety of institutions, ranging from universities to local colleges of further education. In the following paragraphs we outline the institutional pattern of higher education.

THE UNIVERSITIES

1.5 There are now forty-three universities in Great Britain, not counting the Open University, and two in Northern Ireland. The university system was greatly expanded in the early and mid-1960s when seven new universities were founded in England, and one (Stirling) in Scotland, and the ten former Colleges of Advanced Technology were given university status or incorporated into existing universities. There were other changes in the same period.[3] Many, though not all, of these changes were occasioned by the Robbins Report of 1963.[4] The university sector, which had a student population of some 50,000 full-time equivalent students in 1939, and 113,000 by 1962,[5] had by 1977–8 expanded to some 280,000 students.

1.6 The universities form a quite distinct sector of higher education, the funding of which we shall examine in more detail in the next section of this unit. Each university is a self-governing or 'autonomous' institution, validating its own academic awards, that is to say, devising its own courses, setting its own examinations, and alone guaranteeing their standard to the outside world (although most universities use external as well as internal examiners in order to ensure and demonstrate the parity of their awards with those of other institutions).

1.7 The internal structure of government varies. The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge are collegiate, and the colleges collectively *are* in one sense the university, although the effective conduct of university affairs resides in bodies composed of the resident and teaching Masters (popularly called 'dons') of the University and committees responsible to them or elected by them. In the Universities of Wales and of London the constituent colleges are again for most purposes self-governing, but the conduct of central university affairs is largely in the hands of committees composed of the representatives of the constituent colleges and of their teaching staff, which is why it is proper to describe these universities as 'federal'.[6]

1.8 Most other universities are governed by a Council and Senate (in Scotland the terminology differs). The Council, consisting of lay appointees and of the most senior university officers and of representatives of Senate, is ultimately responsible for resource allocation and the general management of the university. The Senate, usually consisting of elected representatives of the academic staff, together with the most senior academics *ex-officio*, controls the

[3]The federal university of Wales was expanded by the grant of university college status to the college at Lampeter. The Royal College of Science and Technology in Glasgow, with the addition of some parts of the Glasgow College of Commerce, also became a university—Strathclyde.

[4]Committee on Higher Education (1963) *Higher Education*. (For the complete reference, see the Bibliography at the end of this unit.)

[5]Report of the University Grants Committee to the Secretary of State for Education and Science (1968). (Full-time equivalent student numbers included in 1978 some 380,000 part-time students, many on weekend courses only, amounting in all to about 15,000 FTEs.)

[6]In the 1977–8 Session an Act was passed by Parliament for the reform of the government of the University of London, which democratized the system by introducing into the controlling bodies representatives of other interest groups within the University such as non-teaching staff.

The university system was greatly expanded in the early and mid 1960s. (Aerial view of the University of Lancaster.)

academic affairs of the institution. In recent years representatives of the student body, and occasionally of the non-academic staff, have been added to either or both of these committees. Each university thus remains self-governing; although the degree to which the system in each may be described as democratic or oligarchic varies (see section 5).

1.9 Despite this, and significantly, British universities receive well over 80 per cent of their funds from public sources. The proportion varies from university to university, depending in part upon the historic private endowments of that university. However, it is difficult to be precise about the proportion of each university's finances that comes from public sources at any given moment. The largest proportion, whether for capital or for recurrent expenditure, comes from the University Grants Committee (UGC), which itself is funded by Government. Universities, however, also receive fees from their students. Most domestic (i.e. British) students receive a mandatory award, or student grant, from their Local Education Authority,[7] which includes since 1977 the

[7]The LEA recoups 90 per cent of its expenditure on such awards from the Department of Education and Science. (see Unit 7 for such grants.) In Scotland the grant is paid directly by the Scottish Education Department, i.e. by central government.

payment of all approved fees. In 1976 and 1977 there was a sharp rise in the fees that the universities[8] were recommended by Government to charge, and fee income may now provide some 20 per cent of the total income of most universities. Some domestic students are, on the other hand, self-financing, and overseas students receive no awards from British education authorities.[9] They still pay fees. That is why the categories of university income do not provide a precise guide to the proportion of the total that comes from public sources. The extreme examples of this phenomenon are the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, which receive no direct grant from public sources. But they derive a significant fee income from LEAs in respect of students in receipt of mandatory award, and most of the Fellows (or resident teaching staff who are members of the governing body of the college) also have university appointments, funded largely through UGC grant. They are thus not quite as independent of public support as at first blush appears.

1.10 Despite this degree of public funding, the independence of the university sector is said to be guaranteed by the channelling of grant through the UGC. It is often described as a 'buffer' between the universities and Government.[10] We shall examine this system in greater length in the next section of this unit. At the moment, it is sufficient to note that it is designed to protect the universities against direct political interference.[11]

THE PUBLIC SECTOR

1.11 The universities differ sharply from local authority colleges in two respects. Colleges maintained by LEAs are independent neither in respect of their own self-government nor in the validation of the courses that they offer. (Their system of government is discussed at greater length in section 5.) Most colleges offering higher-education courses within the LEA system are colleges of further education (CFEs). There are as many as 400 colleges that offer at least one course at higher-education level. Often this will be a part-time course, a Higher National Certificate or Higher Technical Certificate.[12] Such part-time courses usually meet a local need, and grow out of existing non-advanced (i.e. non-higher education) work in the same college. Sometimes, a college will be able to offer a full-time course of higher education, such as the Higher National Diploma or a Higher Technical Diploma, in the same area of study. It is by precisely this process of building higher-education courses upon the experience of those at a lower level that some colleges in the public sector have built up a 'top' of higher education which forms a significant proportion of the work that they do.

1.12 From time to time, attempts have been made to lop off the 'top' by designating within the public sector those colleges that would be primarily or wholly concerned with higher education. The 1956 White Paper *Technical*

[8]A similar level of fees applies in colleges maintained by LEAs.

[9]But some overseas students receive support from a fund established by the Overseas Development Ministry, so that again public moneys flow *indirectly* into the universities.

[10]The use of the term was ascribed by Sir Walter Moberley, a former Chairman of the UGC, to Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the immediate post-war years.

[11]Committee on Higher Education (1963) (The Robbins Report) paragraphs 725–32.

[12]Higher National Certificates and Diplomas used to be validated by Joint Committees of the Department of Education and Science and professional interests in the academic area. In business education, HNCs and HNDs are now validated by the Business Education Council (BEC), and in technical education HTCs and HTDs by the Technician Education Council (TEC) (cf. Unit 12).

Education[13] (followed by the related Ministry of Education Circular 305,[14] grading the remaining FE colleges) designated the Colleges of Advanced Technology, to which reference has been made (paragraph 1.5). From that moment onwards, the designated Colleges began to shed their non-advanced work, and often their part-time courses of whatever level, and their transition into universities became inevitable.[15] The 1966 creation of new institutions called Polytechnics, thirty in number, formed out of those FE institutions that already concentrated predominantly on work at higher-education level, was the next step in the same process.[16] This time, the intention was that the new institutions should never become universities, but should form a permanent top to the Advanced Further Education sector (see section 3).

1.13 Despite the creation of the polytechnics, new courses of higher education have been approved since 1966 at many colleges of further education, primarily to meet local need. There remains, therefore, a very wide distribution of higher education within LEA further education. But there is no doubt that the main area of growth of higher education within the public sector has been in the polytechnics. By the academic year 1976–7 there were 191,000 students in polytechnics, the majority of whom, though by no means all, were pursuing courses at higher-education level. Most polytechnics had by then phased out the bulk of the courses that their precursor institutions had offered at non-advanced level, although courses related closely to the higher-education provision of the institutions were sometimes retained.

1.14 The courses offered by the polytechnics include the higher-education courses validated by TEC and BEC (see footnote 12). There are also courses for the diploma of higher education (DipHE), a two-year course roughly equivalent to the first two years of a three-year degree course. Above all, the polytechnics offer degree courses and some postgraduate work. DipHE, degree and postgraduate courses are validated by the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA), established again as a result of the Robbins Report in 1964.[17] The syllabus, the staff teaching a course, the examining of the students on that course, and the general facilities of the institution (including, for example, the library) are thus subject to regular external scrutiny. Some internally validated courses survive—College Diplomas or Associateships—but they are declining in number.

1.15 Since their designation, the polytechnics have all had a system of government that is an attempt to combine some features of the university system (a Governing Body and an Academic Board corresponding to the university Council and Senate) with the direct and detailed control of FE institutions by their maintaining LEAs which was previously prevalent.[18] We examine this system in detail in sections 4 and 5 of this unit. For the present, we need only note that the polytechnics, just as they are not self-validating institutions, are not fully self-governing institutions either.[19]

[13]Ministry of Education (1956a) *Technical Education*.

[14]Ministry of Education (1956b) Circular 305.

[15]For a critical examination of the process see Burgess, T. and Pratt, J. (1970).

[16]Department of Education and Science (1966) *A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges*.

[17]The CNAA succeeded the National Council for Technological Awards (NCTA), which had existed since 1956, but which, as its name implies, was restricted as to the academic area in which it gave validation. We may now neglect University of London external degrees, which were previously the staple diet of those FE institutions that ran degree courses. You should note, however, that University of London external degree qualifications are still sought by some home-based part-time students, studying through correspondence colleges.

[18]See Department of Education and Science (1967) *Notes for Guidance on the Government and Academic Organization of Polytechnics*.

[19]The government of other FE colleges was subsequently liberalized in a similar fashion to that of the polytechnics, with some variation dependent upon the general level of work of the institution: see DES (1970) Circular 7/70.

1.16 One principle of the 1966 settlement, with the creation of thirty polytechnics, was that advanced work in further education should in general be concentrated in these institutions, except, of course, where it served a purely local need.[20] The reorganization of the teacher-education sector of higher education in the 1970s (see Unit 8) entailed some change in this policy. Hitherto, teachers had been trained in one of two ways: either they took a degree at university and proceeded to the Postgraduate Certificate in Education, or they (the vast majority of them) attended a College of Education where they took a Certificate course, success in which gave them qualified teacher's status. Since the mid 1960s, the more successful on this Certificate course might proceed to a Bachelor of Education degree, validated by the university to which they were linked academically. We examine these links in section 3 of this unit.[21]

1.17 The James Report in 1972, on teacher education and training,[22] recommended that in future all teachers entering the profession should be graduates, and that the Certificate course should be replaced by degree courses. The Government broadly accepted the Committee's recommendations.[23] At the same time, the demand for newly qualified teachers was falling rapidly because of a declining birth-rate. The then Government decided therefore that, while some colleges of education should remain monotechnic institutions catering for teacher education alone, others must diversify their educational provision or merge with other institutions in either the public or the 'autonomous' (university) sectors.[24] At the time that this unit was written (Spring, 1979), five colleges of education had merged with universities, sixty-one had merged with polytechnics or with other colleges of further education, thirty-seven had merged with other colleges of education or become part of formal or informal federations, and thirty remained as free-standing institutions. Some two-thirds of the last category were diversifying their provision into other academic areas than those strictly related to teacher education. Some of those colleges that had merged with colleges of further education other than polytechnics were doing the same, calling themselves 'Colleges of Higher Education' or 'Colleges of Further and Higher Education'. In neither of these cases could the policy of concentration of advanced further education (AFE) courses be said to be exemplified.

1.18 The 1972 White Paper said of the Colleges of Education: 'The Government intend that . . . some colleges either singly or jointly should develop over the period into major institutions of higher education concentrating on the arts and human sciences, with particular reference to their application in teaching and other professions.'[25] In consequence of the pursuit of this policy, it was clear by the late 1970s that there could no longer be a straightforward concentration of AFE courses in the polytechnics, those courses having primarily an applied and vocational orientation, not least in the applied sciences. Instead, there was to be a range of higher-education institutions

[20]Department of Education and Science (1966) *A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges*, paragraph 10.

[21]The BEd degree was a consequence of the Robbins Report (1963). The qualification for entry to the fourth year of a course, following success in the Certificate, and leading to the BEd, varied from university to university.

[22]Department of Education and Science (1972b) *Teacher Education and Training* (The James Report).

[23]Department of Education and Science (1972a) *Education: a framework for expansion;* paragraphs 73–81.

[24]Ibid, paragraphs 148–57, developed by DES Circular 7/73.

[25]Ibid, paragraph 152.

outside the universities, some of which would indeed concentrate upon science and engineering, others of which would be concerned with teacher education plus the arts and the social and biological sciences, and others again which would have a more even mixture of both types of provision.

1.19 The pattern of teacher education courses was also changing in the 1970s. Following a recommendation of the James Committee, adapted by the 1972 White Paper, the DipHE qualification was introduced (see section 3). This two-year course was used by several colleges as an opportunity to give those students entering teacher-education courses an opportunity to 'opt out' entirely at the end of two years, or alternatively to change the direction of their studies away from teacher education specifically towards more general higher education, the objective being the attainment of a degree in either case.[26] Therefore, for reasons both of institutional change and of change in the structure of courses, it is no longer possible to delimit a separate teacher education sector. Professional courses for teachers have become part of the general structure of advanced further education, or of university education. This is perhaps the most important change in the structure of higher education in the 1970s.

THE VOLUNTARY COLLEGES

1.20 Not all Colleges of Education have been maintained by LEAs. Some are 'voluntary' colleges, maintained by charitable bodies, which are in general religious foundations or the churches themselves, and are aided by direct grant from the Department of Education and Science, which normally covers the bulk of their expenditure. Some voluntary colleges merged in the 1970s to form new institutions of higher education.[27] In other areas, difficulty arose when voluntary colleges sought a merger or federation with maintained colleges.[28] We must continue, therefore, to recognize that the existence of voluntary colleges is a further complexity in the structure of British higher education. They are not under the control of an LEA. On the other hand, they are not strictly autonomous in the way that universities are. If the Department of Education and Science were to decide that there should be no allocation of teacher education places to a voluntary college, then it would have little alternative but to close.[29]

THE LONG-TERM ADULT RESIDENTIAL COLLEGES

1.21 There are also colleges, of which perhaps the best known is Ruskin College, Oxford, the trade union college, which cater specifically for mature or adult students, and offer courses leading not to a degree but to other qualifications at higher-education level. Five of these offer two-year courses leading to a diploma.[30] Diploma courses at some of these colleges give access to the second

[26] A good example of such a pattern of course development may be found at Crewe and Alsager College.

[27] Thus the Roehampton Institute of Higher Education was formed by the merger or federation of four voluntary colleges.

[28] Thus in Gloucestershire two voluntary colleges in Cheltenham sought a federation with maintained colleges in that town and in Gloucester itself. The result was an agreement to work together as if the colleges were indeed a federation, although they could not become so in law. Difficulties arise here not under the law of education but in charity law.

[29] The power of the DES to determine the allocation of teacher education places at colleges stems essentially from the power of the Secretary of State to grant or withhold qualified teacher status. In the case of the voluntary colleges the Secretary of State may also, of course, withhold grant.

[30] The sixth college, Fircroft College, Birmingham, was closed in the period 1976–8 as the result of the disturbances at the college and the subsequent report by the committee enquiring into them (Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the problems of Fircroft College under the chairmanship of Andrew Leggatt, QC (1976)). Another college opened in 1978 in the premises of the former Wentworth Castle College of Education in Yorkshire.

year of degree courses at universities: there is, for example, a long-standing arrangement between Ruskin College and the University of Oxford to this effect. Until 1975, students at such colleges were dependent entirely upon the whim of their LEAs in respect of the receipt of a discretionary award, i.e. financial support, both the grant and the level of which were at the discretion of the LEA (see Unit 7). In that year a system of direct (and, for those admitted, automatic) support from DES was instituted. Such colleges are again voluntary, but receive substantial direct grant from DES. Here is yet another and quite separate sector of the British higher education system catering specifically for mature students.

THE RIGHT OF THE SCOTS TO BE DIFFERENT

1.22 Courses at higher education level, within the definition given at the beginning of this section, are offered at a wide variety of institutions in Britain. Indeed, when Scotland is included as well as England and Wales, the complexity is even greater than we have suggested. In Scotland, the Central Institutions are funded directly by the Scottish Education Department and the range of their offerings covers that of local colleges of further education (CFEs) as well as that of polytechnics. Each Central Institution has its own educational character: some are more akin to polytechnics, others to CFEs. It may be argued that no new principle is involved in the Scottish variation on the system, because direct grant status is known in England also, as we shall see. On the other hand, there is no parallel in England or Wales to direct central government funding of institutions, of which some are primarily concerned with courses at non-advanced level.

THE RAG, TAG AND BOBTAIL OF THE SYSTEM

1.23 No system of higher education ever had a more distinguished rag, tag and bobtail than the British system. For, so far, we have neglected three institutions that do not fall easily into any of the categories we have described. One of them is a university, which is not financed through the UGC but by direct grant from the Department of Education and Science: this is the Open University. Since its inception it has continued to receive direct grant on a triennial basis, that is to say, upon a system of three-year negotiation between the University and DES.[31] There were proposals that the Open University might better reside under the aegis of the UGC, but at the time of writing no change had been made in the system.[32] The Open University is unique in that it caters only for mature students in a distance-learning system, quite different from that of any other institution. Like other universities, however, it is a self-governing 'autonomous' institution, governed by a Council and Senate.

1.24 The other two direct-grant institutions of university status are the Royal College of Art and the Cranfield Institute of Technology. The RCA is the premier institution of art education in Britain, running many courses at postgraduate level. Cranfield concentrates on postgraduate courses and post-experience courses in science and technology, and in management. Neither of them, therefore, matches the conventional pattern of a university. As with the Open University, there has been some discussion as to whether they should move from direct funding by DES to UGC grant, but at the time of writing no decision had been taken. Whatever the arguments about the UGC or 'buffer' principle, to which we shall turn presently (see section 2), there is no doubt that all three institutions have flourished under direct grant

[31] In the mid-1970s the triennial principle was eroded, as was the quinquennial system of settling the grants of other universities through the UGC (see section 2).

[32] The arguments for and against such a change run like a silver thread through chapter 16 of Sir Walter Perry's book, *The Open University: a personal account by the first Vice-Chancellor* (1976).

from the DES. This was also the experience of the Colleges of Advanced Technology between 1962 and 1964, when all of them received direct grant from the Department.[33] There is no evidence of political 'intervention' or interference in these institutions. You may find it valuable to remember that in the next section of this unit.

Activity 1 This section contains many illustrations of the proposition that policy-change over many years occurs in a series of disconnected steps, rather than in accordance with a single over-arching strategy. This is arguably desirable too; radical reconsideration of policy for wide areas of provision might be both disruptive and impracticable.[34] The change from the policy of 'concentration' of AFE courses in the polytechnics, which was marked by the post-1972 policy on colleges of education, may strike you as such an illustration. On the basis of this section of this unit you should now try to list at least five others. Spend no more than ten minutes on this. The author's suggested answers to the Activity are given in Appendix 1.

SUMMARY—AND QUESTIONS

1.25 Our examination of the institutional structure of higher education in Britain suggests a number of questions, which will form the basis of the remainder of this unit:

(i) Among these questions must be whether or not the varying systems of management and control[35] of institutions of higher education genuinely reflect differences in aims and objectives, and whether they facilitate the achievement of those aims and objectives.

(ii) We must ask whether or not the concept of 'autonomy' makes sense in a system where institutions are primarily dependent on public sources for their financing; alternatively, whether direct control of institutions of higher education by public bodies, especially those at local level, can serve any useful purpose other than that of ensuring strict financial accountability for the expenditure of public funds.

(iii) If public funding is inevitable, should that be by direct grant from central government, should it pass through an intermediary agency such as the UGC, or should it come in whole or in part from LEAs, whether directly or through the individual student (i.e. via student fees)?

(iv) How does the external system of control and financing relate to the internal management of institutions of higher education, and what are here the practical differences between the system found in the 'autonomous' sector and the public sector of higher education?

(v) We must ask how the total number of student places required is determined and the students distributed, and whether this is the only method of guiding the development of higher education.

[33] See chapter 8 of Burgess, T. and Pratt, J. (1970).

[34] Cf. Braybrooke, C. and Lindblom, D. (1963). They describe this mode of policy formation as 'disjointed incrementalism'.

[35] We may distinguish: (a) control of the staff of an institution, including here control *of* the staff *by* the staff; (b) control of finance and of physical resources; (c) control over the curriculum. (See sections 5 and 6 of this unit.)

(vi) Does the British system of higher education secure the participation in it of all those able to benefit from higher education, including students of mature age?

These are complex questions, and it would not be possible to answer them all fully in a single unit. We shall not attempt to do so, but you may find them useful as a guide to your own reading of the remainder of this unit, and to the notes you take from it.

2 The universities and the UGC

THE UGC AS THE GUARDIAN OF UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY

2.1 The development of public policy by growth and change over a long period (cf. Activity 1 and paragraph 1.25) is well-illustrated by the University Grants Committee system of funding the universities. The UGC began its life in 1919, when, in the conditions of financial stringency resulting from the First World War, it was apparent that some of the new civic universities could no longer provide adequately for their growth or even continued existence without public aid. Grants initially made by the Committee were trivial by modern standards, even allowing for inflation. Within a few years the universities of Oxford and Cambridge were also receiving some moderate support from public funds. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that in the early years the public funding of universities on the basis of the assessment of their needs by the new UGC was seen as a back-up facility, supporting what remained private institutions.[36] But by the mid 1970s the UGC gave some £600 million per annum to the universities. As we have seen in section 1, it had already been seen in the late 1940s as an essential 'buffer' between the universities and the otherwise interfering State.[37]

2.2 This concept of the UGC, and the major role that it now plays in university financing, seem to have been the long-term policy neither of any individual nor of any government. Rather, they resulted firstly from the growth of the university sector (especially in the post-war period), which far outstripped the resources available to the universities from private benefactors; second, from the relative increase in university costs, as compared with the costs of most other public or private activities, itself a consequence of the changing character of scientific and technological knowledge and of research in these areas; third, from the development of the 'positive' State, intervening in every aspect of national and many aspects of personal life. Teaching and scholarship in the universities had to be publicly funded, but equally they had to be protected against control and dictation by an all-encroaching State.

2.3 Side by side with public funding there has grown in strength the doctrine of the 'autonomy' of the universities. It has not always been held in Britain that the universities must be insulated against political interference; for a long time, in the middle ages and in the early modern period, such a doctrine would have occasioned surprise.[38] Nor would the contemporary British acceptance of the necessity of total university autonomy be accepted in other countries: it is alien not only to eastern Europe, but also in some degree to the United States, where State Universities are directly financed by and must respond in some measure to the dictates of the changing political administrations of the territories in which they are situated, and even to western Europe, where the structure of universities may be changed to meet new political priorities.[39] In Britain, however, the doctrine has become an article of faith with university academics at least, and has been accepted

[36]Some sporadic state aid had been given to some universities long before 1919, but it was always in the form of topping-up funds primarily derived from other sources.

[37]For the history of the UGC to the late 1950s, and of State-university relations in general, see Berdahl, R. O. (1959). Professor Berdahl hopes to publish about 1980 an updated analysis of the workings of the UGC.

[38]See Green, V. H. H. (1969) chapters II–IV, and Berdahl, R. O. (1959), chapters II–III.

[39]Cf. the 'reform' of French universities at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s. For the USA, cf. Berdahl (1959), pp. 192–3.

without question by successive Governments, even if it is not a subject of much interest to the bulk of the electorate which returns those Governments to power.[40]

THE GRANTS COMMITTEE PRINCIPLE

2.4 To clarify the British doctrine of the 'autonomy' of the universities, and the Grants Committee principle, we quote here from the Robbins' report:

> It is recognised that subvention involves allocation and that allocation may involve coordination and certain controls; and it is not felt that such measures need be an improper encroachment on legitimate academic freedoms. But it is felt that, without proper safeguards, the necessity for such coordination may easily come to be considered in the context of political considerations and pressures and that the orderly development of academic institutions may be liable to interruption by forces quite foreign either to education or to the advancement of knowledge . . . Fortunately, this country seems to have hit upon an administrative invention that, although not precluding all such dangers, has the effect of making them much less probable—the device of interposing between the government and institutions a committee of persons selected for their knowledge and standing and not for their political affiliation. In this way it is possible to ensure that the measures of coordination and allocation that are necessary are insulated from inappropriate political influences . . . [The university's] freedom of action is further safeguarded by the practice of the University Grants Committee in making its main subventions to recurrent expenditure as block grants, with no specification of the detailed uses to which they may be put . . . There can be no doubt that constitutional arrangements of this sort can provide an efficient shield against the intrusion into academic life and policy of irrelevant political influences.
>
> (Committee on Higher Education (1963), paragraphs 725, 727, 729, 731)

2.5 You will have noticed in this quotation the frequent use of emotive and imprecise words—'forces quite foreign either to education or to the advancement of knowledge', '*inappropriate* political influences'. These words reveal that the Robbins Committee was concerned with a form of direct State or party political interference in the internal affairs and in the academic teaching and research of the universities, of which there seems to be no good example in Britain in this century. The Committee itself said: 'No one acquainted with the history of academic institutions in those countries where education is directly controlled by the state can deny that from time to time

[40]Berdahl, R. O. (1959), p. 169 ff., discussing the absence of partisan controversy about the universities, quotes Lord Simon (from *Universities Quarterly*, Vol. 1, 1946, p. 90): 'the general public regards university education as a remote sphere with which it has no concern.' Berdahl points, as an explanation, to two factors: (i) British universities, unlike American, do not seek to give 'a broad general education to great masses of students'; (ii) the minority receiving a university education has been changing from a social to an intellectual élite, of which many leaders of the Labour Party as well as of the Conservative form part, thus ensuring that 'important figures in the parties and influential persons in the universities' continue, as they long have done, to have a 'community of outlook' (see also paragraph 2.6). He discovered a lack of party policy and propaganda material dealing specifically with the universities. University policy specifically continues to occupy little space in party election manifestoes. Kogan (1975), p. 203, refers to 'increasing public restlessness about their [the universities'] imputed privileges' in the mid-1960s, but he quotes no evidence, and probably refers to 'the irritation felt by politicians and the rest of the educational system at the universities' (p. 197) for their (perceived) unwillingness to change as politicians and educationists would have them change. The present author's political experience has been that universities became a subject of wide public concern only during the student troubles of 1968–70—and then it was not university autonomy which caused that concern.

irruptions of this sort take place'.[41] The word 'irruptions' was nicely, if unfortunately, chosen. Not more than five years after the Robbins' Committee reported, political irruptions became for a short period a regular feature of the British university scene. They stemmed, however, from student activity, and not from interference by central government or Parliament. Indeed, a committee of the House of Commons studied these 'irruptions' and its conclusions were not unsympathetic to the universities.[42]

2.6 It is the fact that British politicians have not in this century sought to interfere in the internal affairs of the universities which may seem as significant as the Grants Committee principle.[43] This conclusion is reinforced when we consider the appointment of members of the UGC. In fact, these 'persons of knowledge and standing' are appointed by the Secretary of State for Education and Science. The Robbins' Report describes them as 'appointed by the Government (but) independent of ministerial and departmental control'.[44] There is nothing to inhibit the appointment of persons selected by virtue of their political affiliation. That it does not happen is a convention, not a mechanism of government. The Robbins' Committee itself recognized this when it said of the UGC 'it may be that such devices can only operate efficiently within certain limits of political temperature'.[45]

2.7 The Committee described this as 'a biological quality'. This is unhelpful. What the Committee had discovered was a characteristic of the behaviour of modern British politicians and Governments—abstention (conscious or unconscious) from direct interference in the internal affairs of universities. The best evidence of all comes from those institutions that have received or are in receipt of block grant from central government. Neither the former Colleges of Advanced Technology nor the present three direct-grant institutions (see paragraphs 1.23 and 1.24) complain of direct governmental interference. Even the Open University, seen once as a 'gimmick' of the then Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, 'made strong and successful representations to successive governments in the hope that our special problems would be sympathetically considered', and survived 'during the Conservative Party's hold on power, and throughout the years of their administration . . . gradually won their political acceptance.'[46]

CAPITAL, EQUIPMENT, AND RECURRENT GRANTS

2.8 UGC grants for capital expenditure (and for equipment) are separate from those to meet recurrent expenditure. Of the former grants the Robbins Committee said: 'These are necessarily specific to particular projects and in the nature of things every application is examined on its merits. Here there is no question of passivity in matters of policy . . . It has been argued by several witnesses that, especially in the period of expansion, the general policy of universities is more dependent on capital grants than on any other; and we have little doubt that this is correct.'[47] Here, the UGC exercises a powerful central control upon university development. It is this control above all which allows it, in conjunction with the Secretary of State for Education and

[41]Committee on Higher Education (1973), paragraph 726.

[42]Report from the Select Committee on Education and Science (*Student Relations*) (1969). For 'irruptions' at one university (in 1970) see Thompson, E. (1970) *Warwick University Limited*, and Report of the Enquiry into the University of Warwick (1970).

[43]Cf. Berdahl (1959), p. 169 ff., and footnote 40 to paragraph 2.3 above.

[44]Committee on Higher Education (1963), paragraph 728.

[45]Ibid, paragraph 731.

[46]Perry, W. (1976), pp. 234 and 30.

[47]Committee on Higher Education (1963), paragraph 730.

Science, to set a target for the ratio of places that shall be science and engineering places, on the one hand, or arts and social science places, on the other. The target ratio for the 1967–72 period was 55:45. For the following period, the DES made no bones about the fact that the decision was its, rather than the UGC's. The 1972 White Paper *Education: a framework for expansion* said: 'The Government have told the University Grants Committee that they would think it reasonable to plan on the assumption that 47 per cent of the full-time students in 1976–7 will be arts-based and 53 per cent will be science-based'.[48]

2.9 From time to time, the Government also sets target student numbers for the universities as a whole, although it is the UGC that allocates funds to individual universities in respect of the target student population that it thinks each university can and should achieve within a given time-scale. The universities are free, of course, to exceed such target figures, but only in the knowledge that they will not necessarily receive additional funding from the UGC if they do so. The Secretary of State and the UGC together thus exercise control over total university development—without directly interfering in the affairs of any individual university.

2.10 Furthermore, when discussing recurrent grant, the Robbins Committee said: '(the UGC's) terms of reference direct it to make the allocations in the light of national needs. While the block grant is given without specified limitations, it is only given after an examination against such a background of the programmes proposed. Moreover, if, in retrospect, the grant given for any quinquennium is regarded as having been spent in any way contrary to public needs as the committee conceives them, this may easily influence the size of the grant for the next quinquennium.'[49] The UGC makes its grant to individual universities after a 'visitation' to that university by members of the committee, where oral evidence is received, and after consideration of the written evidence submitted by the university. In making its block grant, it may indicate to the university that no account has been taken of the university's proposal for development of a new department of *x* or *y*, or that it considers that the university's development programme in some particular faculty is too ambitious. This does not inhibit the university from proceeding with its plans—except that it may have inadequate cash to do so, and certainly has no guarantee of UGC support for such developments in the future. In allocating both capital and recurrent grants, the UGC itself has taken account of 'national needs', which it will have discussed with DES ministers and officials.

WHY DOES GOVERNMENT ACCEPT THE GRANTS COMMITTEE PRINCIPLE?

2.11 The last three paragraphs may provide part of the answer to the question why British politicians and senior civil servants are content to recognize the doctrine of university autonomy, and to abstain from direct interference in the affairs of individual universities. Within a system where academic standards are guaranteed not least by the judgement of academic and institutional peers, and where there is general government control of the pace and overall pattern of university development, then the allocation of funds between individual universities can safely be left to the 'experts' who constitute the UGC. The Government has little incentive to interfere directly in the affairs of individual universities.

2.12 Crucially, however, the Government has another control—the non-university sector of higher education. Part of the unspoken justification for the maintenance of the autonomy of the universities and of the Grants Committee

[48]Department of Education and Science (1972a), paragraph 136.

[49]Committee on Higher Education (1963), paragraph 730.

principle is precisely because fine tuning of the system (which would be impossible if an autonomous sector alone existed) is made easier by parallel support for the polytechnic and other public sector (LEA) colleges. Autonomous institutions are balanced by 'socially responsive' institutions (see section 4). The division between less and more 'socially responsive' sectors is questionable, as we shall see, but belief in its value is one guarantee of the independence of the universities.

THE QUINQUENNIAL SYSTEM AND ITS BREAKDOWN

2.13 Although capital grant for the universities was fixed annually in respect of specific projects, recurrent grant was determined until 1973 on the basis of a fixed quinquennium, or five-year period. Because, at the moment when grant was announced, such a system could take no account of subsequent changes in pay and prices, there was a system of annual supplementation of the grant according to a formula ('the Tress-Brown index') which took account of such variations. The merit of this system was that it permitted each individual university some certainty in its forward planning. Each student accepted by the university would be a member of it for at least three or four years, and major research projects would not fit neatly into a single academic year either. If the universities are to operate efficiently, therefore, it is important that they shall know that students, once admitted, can be taught and that research, once undertaken, can be funded to completion. Even on the quinquennial system, because the five-year period was fixed and not 'rolling', there was some uncertainty as a quinquennium drew to an end. Nevertheless, the system was almost universally accepted in the university world as the most satisfactory that could be devised.

2.14 Plausible though the arguments for the quinquennial system are, we may note here that they have never been accepted in any other area of national life. Local authorities use an annual budgeting system. They are responsible not only for the education of school-children (where it might be argued that their statutory duty to provide places for all children between the ages of five and sixteen prevents any excessively sharp variation in the financing of the schools from year to year), but also for further education, including non-university higher education. The arguments that apply to universities might be thought equally to apply to polytechnics and other post-secondary institutions running courses of more than one year's duration. The Government itself, for the purpose of planning forward public expenditure, uses a 'rolling' five-year period, in which only the expenditure to be incurred in the first year is fixed with any great degree of certainty. The reason is obvious: economic circumstances change, as do political and social priorities. For a long time, the universities were uniquely insulated against short-term change at least.

2.15 In November 1973 the UGC, in writing its report on the 1967–72 quinquennium, welcomed unreservedly the indication of a planning figure for student numbers for the end of the quinquennium after that ending in 1977—an indication given in the 1972 White Paper *Education: a framework for expansion*.[50] They also said: 'There is, too, a defect in the shorter-term planning system which both we and the universities would like to remedy. For each of the last two quinquennia, the timetable of discussion with the Government has necessitated a provisional settlement of recurrent grant for the first year which has involved a complete discontinuity of planning'.[51] They hoped to eliminate this feature of the system.

[50]The projection then made has subsequently been revised downwards several times.

[51]Report of the University Grants Committee to the Secretary of State for Education and Science (1974), paragraph 190.

2.16 Ironically, one month after the committee signed this report, came the economic crisis of December 1973, and with it and its continuation over the next few years the abandonment of the quinquennial system. The original quinquennial settlement was broadly observed for the first three years of the quinquennium. In the third year, 1974–5, there was, however, a restriction of the amount allowed in supplementary grant for price increases. In 1975–6 and 1976–7 the grants were reassessed. The grant for the final year 1976–7 was fixed as a cash limit, i.e. took account of the Government's estimate of the likely rate of inflation during the coming year, and was not subject to subsequent supplementation.

2.17 The collapse of the quinquennial system was not the result of economic stringency alone. There were quite severe short-falls in the number of students seeking places in higher education, and admitted to the universities, when compared with the planning figures used at the beginning of the quinquennium. The increase in tuition fees imposed at this time by the Government, largely as a means of reducing public expenditure by recouping larger sums from overseas students,[52] also necessitated a reassessment of the universities' need for recurrent grant. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Government's policy of containing public expenditure, because of the economic crisis, contributed significantly to the decision to announce university grant on an annual basis only. University income per student fell by nearly 10 per cent between 1973–4 and 1977–8.

2.18 In any event, a grant fixed on a quinquennial principle and supplemented only retrospectively in relation to price and pay changes would have been quite inadequate for the universities' needs in a period of very rapid inflation. It was that inflation which, above all, destroyed the quinquennial system. In March 1977, the Secretary of State, in announcing the university grant for 1977–8, also gave an indication of the likely grant, in constant price terms, for the following two years (already by December subject to reconsideration because of revised student-target figures). In short, the universities had been given some renewed certainty for forward planning, but the quinquennial system was still far from being restored.

SUSPICIONS

2.19 Specific events have from time to time led to suspicion about the intentions of the Government towards the universities. For example, there was a storm in a teacup about a report in 1968 of the National Board for Prices and Incomes on university teachers pay:[53] it was suggested that some small proportion of university salaries should be allocated on the basis of teaching excellence, which might be assessed in part by students. The reaction of academics was predictable. In the event, the Government ignored this section of the report. There was renewed suspicion on the pay front in 1975, when the Houghton Report on the pay of non-university teachers[54] was implemented, while an arbitration award made in favour of university teachers was prevented by the introduction of strict national pay limits in July of that year. The result was a sharp deterioration in the relative pay position of university teachers in comparison with other teachers. Although this caused acrimony for several years afterwards, nothing suggests that it was the deliberate intention of Government to discriminate against university academics.

[52]Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (1977), Vol. 941, Written Answers, cols. 391–3, and Vol. 921, cols. 187–91.

[53]National Board for Prices and Incomes (1968), London, HMSO.

[54]Department of Education and Science (1974) *Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Pay of Non-university Teachers.*

2.20 A misunderstanding similar to those set out in the last paragraph existed about what was seen at the time as one of the most significant changes in the financing of the universities made in recent years. In 1967, it was decided that the books and papers of the UGC and the universities should be opened to the Comptroller and Auditor General (C and AG) and to the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons (PAC). As the UGC itself pointed out, it was common to describe the C and AG as 'the Government's financial watch-dog'. It continued: 'from that description were inferred dangers of governmental interference in the affairs of the universities'.[55] In fact, the C and AG is the appointee of the Government, but his duty is to present reports to Parliament through the Public Accounts Committee, and he and the PAC are often critical of actions of the Government itself. The point at issue was simply whether Parliament should be in a position to be satisfied that the financial procedures and competence of the UGC and of the universities were such that they could handle efficiently the very large sums of money now involved in university support. Nevertheless, there were widespread fears expressed in the university world about the recommendation of the PAC that it should have access to university books and accounts, and the subsequent decision of the Secretary of State, C. A. R. Crosland, to accept the report.[56]

2.21 The task of the C and AG and the PAC is merely to examine the financial regularity, propriety and efficiency of the handling of public funds. It does not extend to policy questions. Nevertheless, the UGC and the universities expressed concern that it might be difficult to keep consideration of policy questions quite separate from the examination of financial probity and efficiency. By 1974, after some years' experience of the new system, the UGC was able to say that, so far, the C and AG's examination had shown that the controls exercised by the Committee constituted an effective system. None of the ill-effects feared by the universities and by the UGC itself had yet occurred. On the other hand, the Committee remained concerned that the new system might in the long run evolve into a more detailed financial oversight of university spending.

2.22 The lack of clarity about the proper limits of enquiries conducted by the PAC may be seen if we quote from its report in 1975–6 on the subject of a company called London University Computing Services Limited (LUCS), wholly owned by the University of London and created in 1961 to undertake on behalf of the university the acquisition, operation and commercial exploitation of an Atlas computer costing £2.4 million. The PAC said: 'We cannot regard an amount of £565,000 as unlikely to be of practical significance and we view with concern the UGC's apparent lack of interest in the continuing use of university funds to make such substantial loans to a commercial company. There is a clear distinction between commercial activities of the type cited by the UGC which are linked directly to the universities' academic function and those which have little or no relevance to such functions, as were the operations of LUCS since 1972. We consider it wholly undesirable that university funds derived mainly from recurrent grants should be used to finance the latter and trust that this will be borne in mind by the UGC in their future dealings with the universities.' There is no doubt at all that the committee was here concerned primarily with the financial propriety of what had occurred. On the other hand, it might be argued that its concern led it into a policy area, namely that of the most effective and economic development of computing services in and for universities.

[55]Report of the University Grants Committee to the Secretary of State for Education and Science (1968), paragraph 593.

[56]House of Commons (1967) *Parliament and the Control of University Expenditure.*

2.23 The same point comes out even more sharply in the 1977 report of the PAC. After examining university recurrent grants over the previous five years, the Committee said: 'The UGC told us that, compared with 1971–2, the universities' average expenditure per student in constant terms had risen during the first two years of the 1972–7 quinquennium and had then steadily declined until it was now at or a little below the 1971–2 level. It seems to us that, in the country's present financial circumstances, grants which have enabled the universities to maintain their expenditure per student at about the 1971–2 level in real terms cannot be regarded as having imposed an unfair burden on the university sector.'[57] It is by no means clear that the PAC's remit to examine the financial propriety and regularity of transactions extends to such judgements as whether or not an 'unfair burden' has been placed upon the universities. The Minister of State at DES, then Gordon Oakes, revealed that resources that had come from recurrent grants, grants from local authorities and tuition fees had declined from £2,815 per student in 1973 to £2,565 in 1977–8 (in real terms, i.e. the true value of money). The CVCP said that even this was an underestimate of the decline in income. On the other hand, the PAC took 1971–2 as the base-line, not 1973–4, so that the figures quoted prove little.[58]

2.24 We must remember, however, that these are mere words; by the end of 1977 no action had been taken, either by the Government or by the UGC, which could be held to justify the fears originally expressed by the universities about the intrusion of the C and AG and the PAC into their internal affairs. It might even be an advantage for the universities that one ground for political criticism of them—that they uniquely spent large sums of public money without being accountable to Parliament for its use—had been removed.

FLIGHT FROM THE SYSTEM

2.25 For some in university circles it was not necessary to wait for the economic stringency of the 1970s. The transfer of the UGC from Treasury to DES in 1963,[59] the increasing *dirigisme* of the UGC in the 1960s, and finally the decision to allow the C and AG and the PAC access to university books and accounts, together with other minor pin-pricks (such as the 1968 NBPI Report), were for them quite enough. They included Professor Max Beloff of All Soul's College, Oxford, and many other eminent academics. Together they founded the University College of Buckingham Limited, better known as the Independent University. Their belief was that a university that received no public funds alone could be genuinely autonomous in present conditions. They therefore looked to industry and to charitable trusts to fund the new institution. Refused a Royal Charter, under which most universities operate, they could not award degrees, and hence decided to confer a 'licence' (a term not commonly used in British higher education and therefore of little specific meaning) upon their successful students. It is still too early, as this unit is written, to evaluate the success of the project. It is not clear, however, to the present author at least, how dependence upon industrial financing is likely in the long run to confer greater freedom of action than dependence upon public financing through the UGC.

[57] House of Commons (1977) *Ninth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts*, paragraph 7.

[58] See *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 23 December 1977.

[59] Which some in the universities saw as making them compete directly for funds with the schools and FE: Report of the University Grants Committee to the Secretary of State for Education and Science (1968), paragraphs 376–85.

A TOOL OF GOVERNMENT?

2.26 In the late 1960s and the 1970s the events we have just described led to allegations that the UGC was merely a tool of the Government, not implementing their 'instructions' in a formal sense, but rather responding constantly to pressure from the Secretary of State and officials in the Department of Education and Science. The charge was put most clearly by Lord Crowther-Hunt, the Minister of State in the Department from 1974–6.[60] He argued that the UGC could not be independent of Government, because its staff consisted of civil servants on secondment from the Department of Education and Science, senior officials from the Department often attended meetings of the UGC and its sub-committees, and the Committee itself consisted only of 'second-line' academics. The UGC, in his view, should consist of the Vice-Chancellors of the universities, or its tasks should be handed to the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, with their own totally independent staff, preferably drawn from the universities.

2.27 Officials of DES and officials of the UGC do meet regularly (as do Ministers and the UGC's chairman). DES officials and those from other Departments (e.g. the Scottish Education Department and the Welsh Office, with their interest in linkages between the universities and schools and FE in their countries) attend meetings of the Committee, but *by invitation only*. Sir Frederick Dainton, a former Chairman of the UGC, has written: 'The fact is that the UGC is the sole determinant of its *modus operandi* and has found it extremely valuable to invite assessors from other bodies . . . But we also have meetings and parts of meetings from which the assessors are excluded and equally we have papers which are seen and discussed only by the members of the UGC.'[61] Whatever the result in practice, it seems inescapable that the UGC should seek advice from those concerned with other areas of the education service which supply students to the universities, with securing adequate resources for the universities, and with establishing 'national needs', within and outside the Government machine. Similarly, Ministers and DES officials must be informed of the basis of UGC thinking if they are to negotiate successfully with colleagues; rightly or wrongly, the Committee has in the past recognized its debt to Ministers in the Department who have presented the case for a particular level of university funding to the Treasury.[62]

2.28 Sir Frederick Dainton has also asserted that the loyalty of officials seconded to the UGC from DES and other Government Departments is complete.[63] That view coincides with that of an earlier UGC, under another chairman, about the service received up to 1963 from civil servants seconded from HM Treasury: 'It was always clear, and totally accepted, that once they "came to the University Grants Committee" those Civil Servants were the servants of the Committee and not of the Treasury.'[64] Whether or not this be right, there is clearly implicit, in Lord Crowther-Hunt's suggestion that the staff of the UGC (or its equivalent) should be drawn from the universities, the principle that the Committee should be a body run by the universities for the universities, rather than a half-way house between them and Government.

[60] *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 28 May 1976, p. 15.

[61] Letter from Sir Frederick Dainton, Chairman of the UGC, printed in *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 11 June 1976.

[62] Report of the University Grants Committee (1968), paragraph 585.

[63] House of Commons Expenditure Committee (1976) *Policy-making in the Department of Education and Science*, Questions 1069–74.

[64] Report of the University Grants Committee (1968), paragraph 576.

2.29 The senior staff of the UGC number some twenty-five. The Committee itself numbers twenty-one, most of the members being part-time. It is perhaps reasonable to suggest that a largely part-time Committee must be dependent on its full-time officers, slightly outnumbering them, for the detailed implementation of its policies, as well as for technical and professional advice on policy. The growth in the size of the university sector and of the public funds devoted to its support (see paragraphs 1.5 and 2.1) must have given greater discretion in such matters to the Committee's officials, compared with that enjoyed by their predecessors thirty years ago. But that does not of itself imply that the academic judgement of the Committee is any more fettered than it was then. Nor are the consequences of growth unique to the UGC: examples may be found throughout the public sector as its activities, and its expenditure, have increased.

2.30 The principle that Vice-Chancellors shall not serve upon the UGC, which Lord Crowther-Hunt criticized, has been maintained in order to avoid, on the one hand, disputes in the Committee which might be construed as no more than one university battling for funds against another, and, on the other hand, any direct confrontation between the Government and the collective academic heads of the universities. The membership of the UGC includes representatives of other sectors of education, of industry and of research. Those members of the Committee who are actively engaged in university teaching and research—the majority—are senior academics with a high repute in their own disciplines. They cannot properly be described as 'second-line'.

2.31 As with the staffing of the UGC, the question of whether its functions should be performed by the Vice-Chancellors collectively relates to its fundamental *raison d'être*. Should the Committee be a Government body or a university body, or neither? Again, we may quote the Committee itself:

> The question is sometimes asked 'Whose side is the University Grants Committee on?' This question misunderstands, in our view, the realities of our function. We are not on any 'side'. We are concerned to ensure that a vigorous and creative University life prospers in this country without interference from the Government of the day and at the same time to ensure that the taxpaying community, represented by Parliament and the Government, gets a proper return for its money in this field of considerable public expenditure.'
>
> (Report of the University Grants Committee (1968), paragraph 6.11)

The Committee must find it difficult to face both ways at once, like the god Janus, but the problem is not resolved by asking it to face one way only. The university sector remains autonomous—but also rationally planned. It is this contradiction that inevitably leads to suspicion about the role of the UGC.

OTHER MEANS TO THE SAME END?

2.32 At certain times, and for a majority of universities, similar funding to that determined by the UGC process of 'visitation' and examination of development plans might have been achieved by 'formula financing'—that is, the use of a formula that relates the financial entitlement of a university to its need. Need could be measured by student numbers (weighted for postgraduates, part-timers, etc.) and the cost of research programmes, with, of course, a deduction in respect of work funded otherwise than by UGC grant (cf. the formula by which central Government allocates Rate Support Grant to local authorities). Some assert that the UGC *does* operate a 'formula' system—but of that there is no firm evidence.

2.33 Such a system might arguably give universities greater freedom of choice. Berdahl quoted a Vice-Chancellor as estimating (in the late 1950s) that about 80 per cent of his quinquennial grant was effectively committed to firmly determined activities and projects, choice extending to only 'part of the remaining amount.'[65] In the 1970s, with acute financial stringency imposed upon what had become larger universities with commensurately greater inherited commitments, and with a slower rate of growth in student numbers, the margin of flexibility must have narrowed sharply. 'Formula financing', with an allowance for growth, might seem to offer a way of escape from this strait-jacket.

2.34 There are, however, obvious difficulties in such a system. Who determines the formula, and what weighting shall be attached to each of the varied activities of universities? (For the multi-purpose character of institutions of higher education, see paragraph 5.4 ff. of this unit.) If DES is to determine the formula after consultation, such a system must occasion the regular round of recrimination that follows each Rate Support Grant settlement, which concerns not only the total size of the grant from central Government to local authorities but also its distribution among local authorities. If the formula for distribution is determined by an independent body, DES settling the total sum, one has merely recreated the UGC in a new form. Academic judgements about value and priority do not become more objectively valid because they are translated into a mathematical formula.

2.35 In a period of continuing rapid growth, such a system might seem to ensure that each university would be able to choose for itself the new developments in which its additional resources should be invested in any year of each period of five years. But that would be to ignore the necessity for capital expenditure, much heavier in medicine or the applied sciences than in other academic areas. This would either be funded by capital grant, as at present, entailing the same scrutiny of development plans, or, as with local authorities, could be funded by loans upon which interest would subsequently be due over twenty to sixty years, thus committing more of a university's future recurrent grant and narrowing steadily its range of options for development. It is in any event inconceivable that Governments would allow universities to spend as they wished upon the expansion of such activities as medical or teacher education, where manpower requirements can be forecast with some precision, and the State is the dominant if not the only employer.

2.36 In a steady state, or 'no growth' situation, universities might find formula financing very restrictive, since they would have in real terms no additional funds in any year, compared with the previous year. In theory, they might still be able to run down one activity in order to develop another. But there are two *caveats*. The first is that universities find it difficult on any financial system to run down quickly any existing activity; buildings and equipment exist, staff have tenure, and students must be serviced.[66] The second is that, granted the large sums of public money involved, Government is unlikely to opt out of a say in the total number of students, or their division between undergraduate and postgraduate, home and overseas, full-time and part-time, and arts- and science-based.

2.37 The most plausible alternative to the present system of public funding of the universities, which neither erodes university autonomy and academic freedom nor prevents the State from translating broad 'national needs' into financial allocations, may thus seem to have exactly the same difficulties inherent in it

[65]Berdahl, R. O. (1959), p. 151.

[66]Cf. Activity 1 and paragraph 1.25. It is always easier to expand the education service by simply adding new activities and institutions to what already exists, than to *substitute* something new for something old.

as the UGC system. Some such body as the UGC would in any event be required, to determine the formula for the distribution of recurrent grant (and perhaps to allocate capital grant). We are left with the old dilemma: can university autonomy, 90 per cent public funding of university teaching and research, and the proper interest of Governments in the expenditure of the taxpayers' money, be better reconciled by any other system than by the present one?

DANGERS AND WEAKNESSES

2.38 One possible danger in the UGC system, granted the high proportion of university funding which comes from public sources, stems from the established academic repute of its 'university members'. Berdahl pointed to the Committee's 'potential rigidity in the face of situations requiring unorthodox responses'.[67] The eminent, it might be argued, are more likely to encourage those who follow the traditions they themselves have helped to create than the radical innovators. The danger is perhaps compounded by the part played in funding major research projects by the Government-funded Research Councils, also largely composed of the academically already eminent. In 1959, Berdahl was able to say: 'one may doubt whether the UGC does in fact suffer from this much rigidity.' The growth of applied science and technology, and of the social sciences, in the universities since then is evidence that the UGC is able to encourage innovation—but not necessarily unorthodoxy.[68]

2.39 We may note, however, that even if there were no evidence that the UGC had encouraged universities to offer unconventional courses, that would not prove that it was the UGC which had stifled their development. Initiative here rests with the individual universities, rather than with the Committee. Thus, the UGC seems neither to have encouraged universities to offer the two-year Diploma of Higher Education (DipHE) courses (cf. section 3), nor to have discouraged them from so doing. The universities themselves, in the 1970s, rejected this course. If the UGC is indeed conservative in such matters, it would seem only to reflect the conservatism of the universities.

2.40 Berdahl pointed to a second possible danger in the UGC system, stemming again from the high proportion of university funds channelled through the Committee.[69] The Committee had 'acquired a formidable *potentiality* for power which could be abused in less happy times.' He quoted Sir Walter Moberly, former Chairman of the UGC: 'Undoubtedly the machinery exists by which the State could, if it were so minded, apply almost irresistible financial pressure to the Universities.'[70] Moberly wrote these words in 1948. Kogan dates the beginning of increasing UGC prescription to the universities to 1949, when grants first included an element to fund growth as well as enough money to maintain the universities at their existing size and level of provision.[71] In that year, the Treasury made the extra grant conditional on approval of scales of fees to be charged by the universities, and national salary scales for academic staff were introduced.[72]

[67]Berdahl, R. O. (1959), p. 190.

[68]For the growth of the social sciences see Westoby, A., Webster, D. and Williams, G. (1976), especially pp. 6–7.

[69]Berdahl, R. O. (1959), p. 191.

[70]Moberly, W. (1948), p. 17.

[71]Kogan, M. (1975), pp. 196–7.

[72]The Treasury was the 'sponsor' Department for the UGC and the universities until 1963, when responsibility passed to the new DES.

2.41 It was the expansion of the 1950s, and the great increase in public funding of the universities that accompanied it, which led to a progressive tightening of UGC controls and to more prescriptive 'advice' to the universities. It was only in the 1952–7 quinquennium that the UGC first asked the universities to submit predictions and bids for growth as one basis for judging the proper allocation of grant to each. By 1968, the letter issued by the UGC to all universities giving guidance for the 1967–72 quinquennium made it plain that funds would be allocated in relation to the number of students within defined subject categories in each university. We have seen that in the 1972 White Paper the Government were themselves explicit about such questions as total student numbers, the division between science- and arts-based studies, and the numbers of postgraduates and of part-time students for the 1972–7 quinquennium.[73] The UGC made these decisions the framework of its own planning and of its guidance to universities.[74] On the other hand, none of these planning figures was exactly attained during the 1972–7 quinquennium. Student demand cannot be predicted with precision—and each university is still free to determine whether or not it will conform precisely to UGC guidance.[75]

THE CENTRAL DILEMMA

2.42 The dilemma facing the UGC as the university system and public investment in it grew apace was clearly expressed by the Committee itself in its reports on the 1962–7 quinquennium.

> If each University does that which is right in its own eyes, with no regard for the totality of university provision or for national needs, there is a clear danger that anarchy and licence, under the universally respected name of academic freedom, will result. On the other hand, if the Committee becomes *dirigiste*, too tidy-minded and too much concerned with overall planning, there is an equally clear danger that the free growth of academic institutions will be stunted by excessive control.
>
> (Report of the University Grants Committee to the Secretary of State for Education and Science (1968), paragraph 566)

The Committee drew attention to increasing national interest in ensuring the efficient expenditure of public funds in the universities, stemming in part from the amount of public money they now consumed, and to public concern about the provision of skilled manpower to meet national needs. It mentioned encouragement of relations between the universities and industry, for which it sometimes provided specific 'pump-priming' funds. Above all, the sheer number of universities, and their decreasing homogeneity and increasing variety of offerings meant that there had to be some central appraisal of their development to avoid uneconomic duplication. The Committee had to decide, for example, which universities should develop biological studies and which should take the lead in the use of audio-visual aids, as well as discouraging particular activities in other universities. 'In short, we are now inescapably involved in making positive judgements, an activity which goes far beyond the capacity of a buffer or a shock-absorber.'[76]

[73]Department of Education and Science (1972a), paragraphs 129–40.

[74]Cf. Tenth Report from the Expenditure Committee (1976), pp. 326–30.

[75]In the late 1970s, Government attempted to restrain the growth in the number of overseas students in higher education, including the universities. But by the end of 1978 most universities had still failed to follow Government and UGC advice.

[76]Report of the University Grants Committee to the Secretary of State for Education and Science (1968), paragraph 564.

2.43 Renewed concern about the supply of skilled engineering manpower led the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology in 1976 to propose that: 'The University Grants Committee should be instructed to regard engineering and applied science training as a privileged area, for which additional earmarked funds should be provided.'[77] It is significant that the Select Committee used the word 'instructed'. Nevertheless, the Government firmly rejected this recommendation. They pointed out that, since the early 1960s, the UGC had consistently devoted the greater part of the resources placed at its disposal to developing facilities in science and technology, with a strong emphasis on the applied sciences. Until recently, provision had outstripped the supply of suitable students. 'In the light of these considerations the Government see no case for a change in the present arrangements for financing the universities.'[78] It is clear from this that the Government saw such an *instruction* to the UGC as a significant change in the system of university financing.

CONCLUSION

2.44 On this evidence the UGC system seems to remain what it has always been—a compromise between Governmental dictation to the universities, based on a political judgement of 'national needs', and the unfettered freedom of the universities to spend public money as they will. Like all compromises, it is uneasy. Suspicions exist in the universities about the intentions of Government, and in Parliament about the efficacy of the UGC in getting the universities to serve the country as they should (or as some politicians think they should). Furthermore, the marriage between the State and the universities, like all marriages, has undergone many vicissitudes of fortune. In the 1970s inflation and financial constraint placed great strains on it. It survived, but it is perhaps not entirely blissful.

[77]House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology (1976) *University–Industry Relations*, recommendation 3.

[78]Ibid, paragraph 32.

3 Binary I: teacher education

THE BINARY SPLIT

3.1 Quite separate from the university tradition is that of the further education sector. In origin, this second tradition has been important in the growth of the university sector. Some of the great civic universities, such as Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield and Manchester, had their origins in local initiative, designed to found institutions that would serve local need, providing part-time as well as full-time courses, and including work at what would now be deemed to be lower than university level. In the mid 1960s, the Colleges of Advanced Technology became universities; prior to 1956 these Colleges had been an integral part of the further education system. But the 'public' (or LEA-maintained) sector of education constantly grows a new head. At exactly the time that the CATs were becoming universities, the process of designating thirty new institutions as polytechnics, still maintained by local authorities, began. Indeed, this was the moment at which the Government sought to formalize the separation between the universities and higher education in the public sector, which had always existed, by declaring that there was to be a 'binary' policy for the development of higher education. The term suggests a sharp and clear division between the universities and all other higher education.

Some of the great civic universities, such as Birmingham, had their origins in local initiative.

COLLEGES OF EDUCATION—THE HALFWAY HOUSE

3.2 There had always been hitherto, and more especially since 1945–50, a halfway house between the universities and further education offered by local education authorities. This was the colleges of education. The McNair Committee, which reported in 1944,[79] were split in their recommendations as to the future of the colleges, which were partly local authority foundations, and partly the foundations of voluntary bodies, mainly those with a religious affiliation. One half of the committee recommended that the colleges should become part of university Schools of Education—that is to say, that each college should be part of a university, although a detached part. The university, of course, would validate the qualification which it offered, so that each college would offer a Teachers Certificate of the University of X. The other half of the Committee also wanted a university connection, but it was to be rather looser. Universities should establish Institutes of Education, or Area Training Organizations, representing the university's own department of education and each of the colleges within the area. The curriculum for the Certificate examination would be discussed within the Institute and its committees, and the university would take part in the examining and validating process. The colleges, however, would remain independent of the university, whether within the local authority sector or maintaining their connection with voluntary bodies. It was this latter view which ultimately prevailed. Most of the colleges seem to have been keen to enter the university sector wholly, but it was university reluctance to accept them which led to the triumph of the second view.

3.3 The controversy reflected a long struggle on the part of the colleges and of the teacher unions to achieve respectability for the teaching qualification by forging links with the universities. This is comprehensible if one looks at the origins of teacher education in Britain—either in colleges run by voluntary bodies, with a narrow curriculum and a monastic existence, or in a quasi-apprenticeship, learning the trade by teaching oneself under supervision.[80]

3.4 In 1963 the Robbins Committee revived the McNair proposal for Schools of Education,[81] stating '. . . It is highly desirable that academic and administrative responsibilities should go hand-in-hand. The colleges should now go forward in closer association with the universities, not only on the academic but also on the administrative side. In particular we think that the time has come for them to have independent governing bodies related federally to the school of education and through it to the university.'[82] To symbolize the change of status, the former teacher-training colleges were to be renamed Colleges of Education. There was also to be a new BEd degree, accessible to the better students on the Certificate of Education course. Once again, the Government and the universities were reluctant to see the colleges enter the university sector so completely. There may have been doubts about the calibre of some college of education staff. It seems certain that the Government was concerned that it might lose control of numbers and specialisms in teacher education. Certainly the universities as a whole did not welcome the prospect of the access to their sector of so many institutions running purely vocational courses; by the 1960s, they had forgotten their own vocational origins in the middle ages, running courses designed to facilitate entry to the Law and the Church.

[79]Board of Education (1944) *Teachers and Youth Leaders* (The McNair Report).

[80]The history of this is examined in detail in Niblett, W. R., Humphreys, D. W. and Fairhurst, J. R. (1975) and more briefly in Hencke, D. (1978), pp. 13–26.

[81]Committee on Higher Education (1963), pp. 107–25.

[82]Ibid, paragraph 353.

3.5 The perhaps inevitable result was another compromise. Colleges were to remain administratively separate from the universities and the Institute of Education system was to continue. However, they were indeed renamed 'Colleges of Education'. The new BEd degree was introduced. On the other hand, admission to it was passed to each individual university, and some were more liberal than others: in a few cases admission to the final or degree year depended upon the students' educational qualifications at GCE 'O' and 'A' Level before they began the certificate course. Change in administrative arrangements had to await the Weaver Report of 1966, and the 1968 Education (No. 2) Act which gave effect to it, requiring the creation of an independent governing body and an Academic Board for each College of Education.[83]

3.6 The Colleges of Education thus remained the halfway house between the university and the public sectors of higher education. They could offer to a minority of students a degree course validated by a university. Their staff continued to take part in curriculum discussions, in examinations, and in validation, through the university Institute of Education. The colleges were still maintained by either a local authority or a voluntary body, but each of them was to have its own quite separate and independent governing body, albeit with representatives of the maintaining authority or agency sitting upon that governing body. They were thus remote from the technical colleges, which at that time might be governed by a sub-committee of the local education authority directly, and which offered courses which were in large measure externally validated by public bodies outside the university sector (the Joint Committees, upon which the DES were represented through the Inspectorate, and which validated National Diplomas and Certificates; or the Royal Society of Arts; or the City and Guilds of London Institute; or the Regional Examining Bodies). The staff of the colleges mixed with university staff in the Institute of Education and its committees. On the other hand they were not part of the university itself. Entry to the new BEd degree was controlled by the university Senate, at whose mercy the colleges were. Although some of these changes–namely, those affecting college government—were to be paralleled a few years later throughout the FE sector, there is no doubt that in the late 1960s it was improper to speak of a 'binary' system, however often this phrase was used by Ministers. It would have been more proper to describe it as a 'trinary' system.

3.7 This last point is essential to the understanding of much of Chapter IX of Regan, *Local Government and Education* (set book), which you should now read. (In doing so, remember that the term Area Training Organization (ATO), which Regan uses, is to all intents and purposes synonymous with the term Institute of Education). Regan brings the story of the colleges of education nearly up to date, to 1975. The 1970s were a peculiarly troubled decade for the colleges, as you will understand as you read Regan. Take notes as you read and be prepared to answer some questions afterwards. You should spend no more than fifty minutes on this reading. Also, you could with advantage read again paragraphs 1.16 to 1.20 of this unit.

Activity 2 You should now answer the following questions. Try not to use more than four sentences in answering each question. Again, spend no more than fifty minutes on this activity.

(a) What criticisms were advanced of the pre-1972 ATO system?

(b) What were the principal recommendations of the James Committee with regard to teacher education?

[83]Department of Education and Science (1966) *Report of the Study Group on Government of Colleges of Education* (the Weaver Report).

(c) What were the main criticisms made of the James recommendations?

(d) How did government policy announced in the 1972 White Paper 'Education—a Framework for Expansion' chiefly differ from the James recommendations, and why?

(e) In what way does teacher education remain a separate sector of higher education, requiring separate regional machinery for its administration?

(f) What effective control do LEAs exercise over their Colleges of Education?

(g) Who pays for teacher education, and what are the administrative implications of the system of 'pooling'?

(h) To what degree are Colleges of Education autonomous?

You should complete your answers to these questions and then read the model answers to this Activity, given on p. 69.

THE CRUCIAL DECISION

3.8 The most significant amendment made by the Government to the James recommendations was perhaps the decision that Colleges of Education should be encouraged to merge or otherwise form links with institutions offering other forms of higher education—whether universities, polytechnics, or CFEs (see Activity 2, answers (d) and (e) in Appendix 1). Although this decision can be defended on educational grounds, as we shall see, it may well have been partially determined by demographic change. The birthrate had been falling since 1965, and by 1972, the date of the Government's White Paper, it was already clear that fewer teachers would be needed than had been assumed in the 1960s' projections, to achieve the same pupil : teacher ratio in the schools (see Unit 8).[84] The previous system, with most teacher education conducted in colleges sharply separate from the rest of the higher education system, had lent itself well to the forced expansion of the 1960s. The new uncertainty, with contraction of teacher supply an alternative policy option, suggested institutional flexibility—the possibility of transferring teacher-education places to other uses, and of permitting students to switch direction away from studies leading only to a teacher qualification, after they had already entered college.

3.9 The continuing fall in the number of live births up to 1978 confirmed this policy. By the end of 1976 Government policy was that the number of public-sector teacher-education places should be reduced to some 46,000 by 1981 (despite an increase in in-service education and training).[85] This would be about two-fifths of the peak attained at the beginning of the 1970s. It could be argued that more students could have been admitted to teacher education and subsequently employed in the schools, thus reducing pupil : teacher ratios, but here economic constraints may have played a part in determination of policy.

[84]Department of Education and Science (1972a), paragraphs 148–57. Paragraph 150 suggested that 60,000 to 70,000 initial training places would be required by 1981 in non-university teacher education, compared with the 1971–2 figure of 114,000.

[85]Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (1977), Vol. 924, cols. 962–3, and Vol. 934, cols. 32 and 39–40.

3.10 The reorganization of the Colleges of Education has proceeded rapidly (see paragraph 1.17). Where a college of education merges with a polytechnic, then all or nearly all of the work of the institution is likely to be at higher-education level, and the philosophy of the 1972 Government White Paper *Education: a framework for expansion* is likely to be exemplified. That is to say, there will be courses of higher education, leading to degrees (or to the DipHE), that will include an education component. Those who take a degree, or top-up their DipHE with further education and training in order to achieve a degree, may emerge as qualified teachers. They may equally emerge with a qualification that gives them entry to another profession, or alternatively gives them simply a qualification upon which they must subsequently, after employment, build their own profession. Students may here enjoy the possibility of specialized education to a high level in a particular subject, especially in the sciences and technology, which did not always exist in the former free-standing colleges of education.[86]

3.11 There may be greater difficulty in embodying this principle across the academic spectrum where a college of education has merged with a CFE, a large part of the work of which was previously below higher-education level. If that FE college ran GCE 'A' Level courses in chemistry, but no higher education courses in that subject, then a merger with a college of education is unlikely of itself to produce approval from validating bodies for a degree course leading to a teacher qualification in chemistry as a main teaching subject. Equally, if we assume that the college was running courses in mechanical engineering, perhaps at degree level, perhaps at HND level, then it might be argued by some that there is no demand in the schools (whatever the situation in FE itself) for qualified teachers in mechanical engineering.

3.12 Others see advantage in having within the same institution the potential for the education of all post-16s, leading young people from one stage of their education to the next and perhaps producing some qualified teachers who, in the traditional system, might have dropped out of education at a relatively early age, or never considered teaching as a career. There remains the danger that, because of the status-pull of higher education, such colleges will diversify their higher-education provision at the cost of opportunity for 16- to 19-year-olds.

3.13 Some colleges which have remained independent have attempted to diversify their provision into 'general' (i.e. non-teacher) higher education, sometimes offering DipHE and degree programmes, which up to the end of the first or the second year give the student the option of choosing to proceed to a teacher qualification or to another form of degree, most commonly in the arts or social sciences.[87] In such cases, education may be offered as one optional subject for the DipHE, which is normally organized on a modular basis—that is, with several self-contained subjects studied each year, perhaps with a restriction upon second-year options, depending upon the choice made in the first year. Successful students may subsequently proceed to the degree year or two years of the course, studying options that may or may not lead to a teacher qualification. Such a system offers the clear advantage of allowing the student to delay his or her choice of profession until the end of the first or second year of higher education, which was never permitted when the colleges of education were a separate sector catering for teachers only. This choice is still

[86]The five colleges that have merged with universities will, of course, also offer degrees in education—but not DipHE qualifications.

[87]For example, Bulmershe, the former Berkshire College of Education, and also Crewe and Alsager College, in Cheshire, an amalgam of two former colleges of education.

not available in that minority of colleges which have continued to be 'monotechnics'—that is, institutions offering only teacher-education courses, albeit to degree level.

VALIDATION OF QUALIFICATIONS

3.14 A further difference between colleges lies in the validation of courses. Apart from those colleges that merged with universities, most colleges, whether remaining free-standing or having become part of larger public-sector institutions, have chosen to have their DipHE and degree qualifications validated by the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA), thus bringing them into line with the remainder of the public sector of higher education.[88] A minority, however, have chosen validation by their local university. A college that has not merged with the university, but whose qualifications are validated by a university (so that the student gains a university degree at the end of his or her course) may properly claim to be in that respect a part of the university sector. A college which seeks validation by the CNAA, even if it is a voluntary college, is in that respect part of the public sector of higher education. The former colleges of education are thus split in more than one way. Apart from differences in the funding and government of institutions, we may divide teacher education by reference to the source of the validation of qualifications.

THE EVOLUTION OF A 'SYSTEM'?

3.15 In 1969, in England and Wales, teachers might gain their right to teach in the schools by (i) attending a course at a college of education leading to a certificate of education; (ii) taking a university degree, followed by a post-graduate diploma in education; (iii) entering the schools immediately after gaining their degree, whether or not they had any specific teaching qualification. Since then, successive changes of policy have substantially altered this pattern. First, Edward Short (Labour), when Secretary of State, removed the possibility of teaching in schools without a teacher qualification.[89] Second, the commitment to an all-graduate entry to the profession announced in the 1972 White Paper (Conservative), itself based largely upon the James Report, has led to the gradual decline of the certificate of education qualification, to be phased out from 1979.

3.16 Thirdly, the willingness of the Government to accept concurrent patterns of teacher education, with personal and professional education intermixed, in defiance of the James recommendation that most teacher education should be on the consecutive pattern, with professional training following a period of general higher education, has led to the development of a variety of patterns of teacher education. Some students will qualify, primarily in the universities, by taking a general degree followed by a one-year diploma in education. Others will take a general two-year DipHE followed by one year (or perhaps two years) of continued education and training leading to a degree, with a varying mixture of professional and personal higher education. Others will take a degree in which professional and personal higher education are mixed on the concurrent pattern.

[88]The CNAA validates the degree courses offered by the polytechnics, for example.

[89]Short, once a headmaster, had been a prominent member of the National Union of Teachers, and his decision to eliminate unqualified teachers from the schools was in accordance with the policy of the Union. But so was the 1972 decision of Margaret Thatcher to concede all-graduate entry to the profession, a long-standing Union demand (cf. paragraph 3.3 above).

3.17 Finally, some will study in the same institution for the whole of their course or courses—whether it be a university, a polytechnic or a college of higher education, or a monotechnic college of education. Others will transfer from one institution to another to complete their professional training. They will emerge with qualifications which are variously validated by the CNAA and by individual universities.

3.18 How did this confusing pattern emerge? It is the consequence of the diffusion of power within the British educational system. In Great Britain, DES cannot dictate to the universities, which are autonomous institutions. The CNAA is similarly autonomous, as a chartered validating body. The future of the voluntary colleges could not be dictated by DES either, although it could sometimes achieve its will by persuasion and covert threats.[90] With local authority colleges, proposals (other than for closure) had to come from the maintaining local authority itself, whatever DES's coaxing and cajoling. Thereafter, the initiative for course proposals rested with the colleges themselves, although within the constraints of a total number of teacher education places imposed by the Department.

3.19 It is too early to judge whether the future intake of teachers to the schools will be superior in ability to that of the past: it is, however, certain that it will be an all-graduate entry. It is similarly certain that the existence of a separate sector of teacher education is in rapid process of disappearance, as the colleges become to all intents and purposes part of the university or of the public advanced further-education sector. Although it may be argued that this is no bad thing, because it ends the isolation of the education of teachers from that of those who will enter other professions, and it widens the professional choice of those entering higher education, it is clear that the process of change was a result more of an inherited system of educational administration in England and Wales than of the careful pre-planning of a desirable future.[91]

CONCLUSIONS

3.20 This section of the unit suggests that:

(i) an examination of the development of teacher education since 1945 casts doubt on any straightforward division of higher education into two sectors—the university (or 'autonomous') and the maintained (or 'public'). Public sector teacher education maintained for most of this period a strong university connection, although it varied in form, and the universities were able to exercise influence and, for much of the period, academic control over the curricula of the public sector colleges;

(ii) in the 1970s, the division between university teacher education and that in the public sector was becoming more clear-cut, although the pattern of validation of qualifications was not four-square with the division of teacher education between the autonomous and maintained sectors. The 'binary' division thus remained blurred;

(iii) local authority colleges of education are subject to external control of the courses they can offer and of the validation of these courses, although this is not exercised by the LEA itself. Their funding comes from all local authorities

[90]The Church of England Board of Education proposed that All Saints College, Tottenham, should close, and Culham College, Oxfordshire, remain open. In the end, pressure from Ministers achieved the opposite outcome.

[91]See Hencke (1978). Although the Scottish system of educational administration does not differ sharply from the English, having the same balance between the powers of central Government and local authorities, the struggle against proposed college closures in Scotland was much more successful than it was south of the Border. The number of student teachers was reduced, but colleges survived.

collectively, and is largely regulated by 'norms' set by DES. In consequence of these factors, and of the government structure introduced into the colleges in the late 1960s, direct LEA control of them is weak. The voluntary colleges are similarly subject to external academic control, and rely upon DES financing. It is thus misleading to describe non-university teacher-education as 'the local authority sector';

(iv) consistent pressure from the teaching profession (through the teacher associations) for enhanced status may have helped to maintain the university connection and ultimately to achieve all-graduate entry to teaching. This is an illustration of the long-term influence of interest-groups in the British educational system (see Unit 2);

(v) in recent years changes in teacher education have proceeded by a succession of policy decisions, some applying to all colleges, others to individual institutions only, rather than in accordance with a grand scheme.[92] The pattern emerging in the late 1970s was influenced by the James Committee recommendations, the policies espoused by successive Ministers and the officials advising them, demographic factors (the fall in the birthrate), the state of the economy, the local relations between colleges and universities, the desires of local authorities and of voluntary bodies, and the initiatives of college staff. There was no 'national plan', single-mindedly devised and rigidly implemented.

3.21 In section 4 of this unit we examine policies for advanced further education—'general' (non-teacher) higher education within the public sector. Our examination of teacher education suggests that we might usefully look for influences on policy development that were not always explicit or obvious, and should not assume that 'local authority control' is necessarily as direct as the phrase might suggest.

[92]This is another example of 'disjointed incrementalism'—and, if we remember the closure of many colleges, of 'decrementalism' also (cf. Activity 1).

4 Binary II: polytechnics and other colleges

INTRODUCTION: THE VARIETY OF COLLEGES

4.1 In previous paragraphs of this unit we have referred to the merger of some colleges of education with polytechnics and with other CFEs. You should now read (if you have not already done so when studying Unit 12) Chapter X 'Educating the School Leaver', in Regan, *Local Government and Education* (set book). This is partly about advanced further education (i.e. higher education in the public sector) and partly about non-advanced further education. Regan's account is broadly accurate, and we do not intend to repeat his argument here.

4.2 It will be apparent to you from your reading that the so-called binary system has always existed. Indeed, many of the great civic universities have their origins in locally founded and run institutions. At a later date, the Colleges of Advanced Technology, most of which began as colleges maintained by the local authority, transferred to the university sector (cf. paragraph 1.12). That is, there operated in English and Welsh higher education a system of promotion by merit, the ultimate admission to Valhalla being the grant of a Royal Charter and university status. Merit seems to have been perceived as running an ever-increasing proportion of advanced-level courses, i.e. courses terminating at above the level of GCE Advanced Level, some of them degree courses or the equivalent thereof, or at the least Higher National Diploma courses equivalent to the first two years of a degree. As you will have seen from Regan (pp. 168–9), the creation of a formal hierarchy of institutions outside the universities took place in the years 1952–7. At the end of that process, the public sector or maintained colleges were divided into four categories—local colleges, area colleges, regional colleges, and the Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATS), the last category and some of the penultimate receiving government grant at the rate of 75 per cent in support of their work, as opposed to the normal grant to local authorities which ran at approximately 60 per cent of their expenditure.

4.3 This additional grant ceased in 1959, but shortly afterwards the CATs began their move into the university sector, via a period in which they received direct grant to support them from central government rather than local government. This division of institutions did not mean, however, (and neither does the polytechnic policy of 1966) that higher education in the public sector is confined to a limited number of designated institutions. There will be about 400 public sector institutions in 1981 with students on higher education courses, of which more than 200 will provide courses for full-time and sandwich students. That is, only some half of the public sector institutions running higher-education courses run full-time courses at this level; the remainder run part-time courses or block-release courses only—such as the Higher National Certificate or the Higher Technical Certificate. These are in the main local colleges (or area colleges), which serve the needs primarily of the population resident within a few miles, although sometimes taking students from across LEA boundaries.

PROBLEMS

4.4 Several questions immediately come to mind. If the public sector still contains such a widespread distribution of higher education courses, is it meaningful to describe it as an entity at all? If it is, what is the justification for the separation of the polytechnics specifically, in consequence of the 1966 White Paper?[93]

[93]Department of Education and Science (1966) *A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges.*

Since part of the purpose of the polytechnic policy was stated to be the 'concentration' of advanced-level or higher-education work within the thirty designated polytechnics, how does that fit in with the process we examined in the previous section of this unit, namely the creation of new colleges of higher education out of the amalgamation of colleges of education with polytechnics or with colleges of further education or with each other? Does not that imply the opposite of concentration? Further, if there is a justification for local authority control of institutions serving only their own localities, or perhaps occasionally providing further education at higher-education level for students from a neighbouring authority, how does one justify local-authority control of institutions that serve a region or perhaps the nation as a whole? When an institution in the public sector is concerned entirely or almost entirely with work at higher-education level, how is it to be differentiated from a university save in terms of its system of government—which may seem scarcely relevant to the academic content of its work?

4.5 Finally, we must ask if the so-called binary system[94] is really a binary system at all, or is rather a way simply of distinguishing the universities from other institutions, which may themselves still be divided into several leagues, with unclear boundaries between their membership? In short, how does the binary system differ from the old promotion by merit to university status, which was the accepted practice before it was formalized?

SOME ANSWERS

4.6 The answer to some of these questions is simple. Government ministers since 1966 have repeatedly said that none of the polytechnics (and one therefore assumes none of the other colleges in the public sector) will be promoted to university status. That is, the principal distinction between the post-1966 system and the old system is that there is, for the time being at least, a ban upon entry to the closed circle of the universities. Secondly, it may be argued that the polytechnics at least differ from the universities in having a higher proportion of courses of an 'applied' or vocational nature. As the 1966 White Paper said: 'As mixed communities of full-time and part-time teachers and students, they [the polytechnics] will as a whole have closer and more direct links with industry, business and the professions'.[95] It remains true today that a high proportion of polytechnic graduates find ultimate employment in industry and commerce—almost certainly a higher proportion than of university former students.

4.7 On the other hand, several polytechnics have mounted degree courses in non-applied areas, primarily in order to meet student-demand.[96] Further, it has been demonstrated that the polytechnics had, by 1969, very early in their lives, already shed many of their part-time students.[97] It is reasonable to

[94]Cf. paragraph 3.1. The word 'binary' seems to have been used, at least internally in DES, at the very end of the 1959–64 Conservative administration, but came into general use under the Wilson Labour administration of 1964 onwards.

[95]Department of Education and Science (1966) *A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges*, paragraph 4.

[96]There were frequent complaints during the 1970s that places in higher education in applied science and engineering remained unfilled—itself a reflection of the subjects taken at school by applicants for higher education, and perhaps of the quality of teaching in the schools in particular disciplines, and of careers advice. See, for example, the speech of the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. James Callaghan MP, at Ruskin College Oxford, 18 October 1976. The excess of places over demand in the science subjects was itself partly the consequence of deliberate government policy: the proportion of science and engineering places, as opposed to arts and social science places, fixed for the universities for the 1967–72 period was 55:45, and from 1972–7 was 53:47.

[97]Burgess, T. and Pratt, J. (1974), pp. 67–88.

'As mixed communities of full-time and part-time teachers and students, the polytechnics will as a whole have closer and more direct links with industry, business and the professions'—as does Huddersfield Polytechnic.

suppose that the decline has not been marked since that date, and that the principal reason for it was the interaction of the 'pooling' system of financing with the previous student composition of the newly designated polytechnics. It was important for many of them to transfer to local FE colleges work that was not sufficiently advanced to be poolable—that is, to become a charge on all local authorities rather than upon their own maintaining LEA. In that way, they could become in large measure financially independent of their LEA. That they concentrated upon the development of degree and other poolable work is beyond doubt.

4.8 The argument of the last paragraph is related purely to the thirty polytechnics. Yet, in 1978, more than ninety institutions in the public sector were almost wholly concerned with advanced or poolable work. This was, in part, a consequence of the failure of the policy set out in the 1966 White Paper on polytechnics, which said:

> Full-time higher education must also continue where there are special needs which cannot be met by the Polytechnics and specialist centres, and where there is adequate student support. These needs may be due to

special local circumstances, the impracticability of transfer to a Polytechnic until additional accommodation becomes available, or student demand that cannot be catered for otherwise . . . It is not, however, proposed that colleges not already engaged in full-time higher education shall embark on it save in exceptional circumstances.

(Department of Education and Science (1966)
A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges, paragraph 22)

It is, however, primarily the result of the policy outlined in the 1972 White Paper for the merger of Colleges of Education with other institutions, thus forming a general public sector of higher education (see paragraphs 3.10 to 3.13).

4.9 Some have seen this as a final culmination of the binary policy, separating public sector institutions of higher education from the universities.[98] It is equally arguable that what has happened is a denial of the policy set out in the 1966 White Paper on polytechnics, not only because the new colleges of higher education and their ilk will seek to mount courses of higher education in many disciplines, thus contradicting the policy of concentration announced in the 1966 White Paper,[99] but also because the balance of work in many of the new institutions is the reverse of that intended for the polytechnics. An institution which was (or part of which was) a former college of education is likely to concentrate most heavily upon the arts, social sciences, and pure sciences, simply because this is where the expertise of the staff inherited from the colleges of education lies. No college of education taught mechanical or electrical engineering, for example, as a main subject for intending teachers.

4.10 If events since 1972 do not constitute a reversal of the binary policy, at least we can say that they have brought about a sea-change in it. In the future, there are to be some 400 public-sector institutions offering higher education, of which thirty (the polytechnics) will offer primarily, but not solely, courses of an applied or vocational character, of which a further sixty to seventy will be concerned mainly with higher-education work, with a strong element of teacher education, with another 100 or so colleges running some full-time higher-education courses in a variety of disciplines, while a further 200 institutions are offering part-time higher-education courses only.

WHY POLYTECHNICS?

4.11 It is now time to examine why thirty polytechnics were designated at all. The Robbins Report had suggested that some of the regional colleges, so named in 1956, might 'profit from federation with another technical college or with a college of education, or both.' It had also suggested that some of the more successful regional colleges might become universities, or constituent parts of universities.[100] Thus, while it partly anticipated the grouping of colleges, which was a feature of the development of the polytechnics, its basic philosophy was the antithesis of that embodied in the 1966 White Paper, since

[98]Hencke, D. (1978),

[99]'The effect of distributing it [full-time higher education] as widely as at present is that many departments and colleges are too small to sustain high academic standards and to provide a satisfactory corporate life. This also involves an uneconomical use of resources—not least of teachers qualified to undertake the higher levels of work. A considerable measure of concentration is therefore essential.' Department of Education and Science (1966) *A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges*, paragraph 10.

[100]Committee on Higher Education (1963), paragraphs 4.19 and 4.20.

it envisaged a continuation of the old system of promotion by merit to university status. The arguments for and against the rejection of the Robbins recommendations are set out in Regan, pp. 182–5.[101]

4.12 We may deal briefly with what Regan calls the first and second arguments for the polytechnic policy. The first argument, that the universities could not meet the rapidly rising demand and need for vocational, professional and industrially-based courses of higher education, some of them at below degree level and some part-time, is patently valid—if by 'universities' we mean only the universities then existing or about to be given their charters. If, however, we assume that, instead of the creation of thirty polytechnics, thirty new universities had been created out of the same existing institutions, with the same type of remit as the polytechnics, while existing universities were encouraged to change in the direction that the then Secretary of State, Anthony Crosland, indicated, then the argument loses much of its validity. There is a hidden premise to the argument, namely that the mere grant of university status would ensure that institutions would model themselves upon traditional English universities, and neglect the objectives which Crosland wished to set for them.

4.13 The same premise partially underlies the second argument also. Crosland suggested that to remove from further education all degree-giving institutions must depress morale in the further-education system. But is not obvious why morale in a local college of further education, which offers no higher-education courses, should be more depressed if the degree-giving institution down the road is a university than if it is a polytechnic. Indeed, the argument appears to make sense only if it is assumed that any college of further education could offer courses of higher education, and that assumption is denied by the polytechnic policy itself, with its emphasis upon concentration of at least full-time work in the polytechnics. It is true, as we have seen, that by 1980 there will be some 200 colleges of further education offering part-time courses of higher education, but their principal work is normally with 16–19 students, who as a group are arguably distinct from post-18 or adult students.

4.14 Let us therefore turn to Crosland's final argument, as Regan calls it, which seems to embody most clearly this hidden premise. In his Woolwich speech,[102] Crosland said: 'It is desirable in itself that a substantial part of the higher education system should be under social control, and directly responsive to social needs.' What is the cash value of the concept of 'social responsiveness'? Crosland and others seem to have meant by this primarily a readiness to offer professional, vocational and other applied courses, rather than the 'pure' academic study that forms the basis of many university courses (though not of all). Some of these would be sandwich courses, offering the student a period or periods of work in industry, commerce or one of the professions while he was still completing his more theoretical studies. These and part-time or block-release courses would arise naturally from the demands of local or regional industry, commerce, local government or social services; they would thus ensure both that the needs of the economy and of society were met and that the individual student would be more likely to obtain employment in which he could utilize his higher education directly.[103]

[101] A brief account of the polytechnic policy is given by Fowler, G. T., in Niblett, W. R. and Butts, R. F. (1972), pp. 268–80. Longer and more contentious accounts of the new policy will be found in Robinson, E. (1968), Burgess, T. and Pratt, J. (1971) and Burgess, T. and Pratt, J. (1974). An interesting American critique of the policy is given by Trow, M. (1969), *Higher Education Review*, Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 27–43, reprinted in Bell, R., Fowler, G. T. and Little, K. (eds) (1973).

[102] Speech of the Rt. Hon. C. A. R. Crosland at Woolwich Polytechnic on 27 April 1965.

[103] The concept of 'social responsiveness' also underlines what Regan calls Crosland's fifth argument—the need to enhance professional and technical education.

4.15 Not everyone will accept this argument as it stands. Thus, Sir Peter Venables argued that the binary divide 'pre-supposes a distinction between the vocational and the fundamental in technological education which belongs to the nineteenth century . . . The point is not to freeze the gap between the study of science and its application but to close it.'[104] He went on to argue that such a division implied that narrowly educated graduates, taking purely vocational courses, would not be able to anticipate new technological developments and would be merely high-grade technicians. This may have been a fair criticism of Crosland's phrasing, and Sir Peter as the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Aston, itself a former CAT, was certainly offering liberal rather than reactionary criticism. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the polytechnics have mounted such narrow technological courses as to justify this criticism. Indeed, it might be fairer to argue that neither the polytechnics nor the universities nor the Government have yet grasped the need to provide for the re-education of graduates, technicians, craftsmen (and indeed all levels of worker), within the course of their working lives, as technology and society change (see section 6).

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE CHANGING NEEDS OF SOCIETY

4.16 'Social responsiveness' may be given a second meaning. It may be argued that we construct academic 'disciplines' and determine what shall be their proper content in order to advance our society as we perceive it and its needs, or in order to aid a particular interest-group within that society. Some disciplines then ossify, and continue to occupy a privileged place in education and in research, which can no longer be justified by reference to contemporary social need.[105]

4.17 That universities and other institutions of higher education are conservative should occasion no surprise. Once a discipline is well-established, and there are considerable numbers of people engaged in teaching that discipline and researching within it, then it will be difficult to run it down and substitute for it work of more contemporary relevance, even if that work is so perceived by those educated in the traditions of the past. Indeed, institutional policies, like those of Government, normally develop by the addition of new policies and new provision to what already exists, rather than by any process of attempting to create a *tabula rasa* and draw upon it. In this context, 'social responsiveness' may be seen as the institutionalization of a readiness to change educational and research work more rapidly than the universities have done historically, in response to the express demands of society and of individuals.

4.18 For a long time, many British universities have had inter-disciplinary courses, as diverse as Politics, Philosophy and Economics (PPE) at Oxford, the inter-disciplinary first year at Keele, and the Scottish Ordinary Degree. But some of the polytechnics and some Colleges of Higher Education, as well as the Open University, have developed the concept of inter-disciplinary courses much further, by mounting 'modular' or credit-based degree or DipHE

[104] *The New Statesman*, 21 January 1966.

[105] Thus, the dominance of Latin in medieval universities is explicable by the need for all entrants to the Church or the Law or indeed the Government service to be fluent in the Latin language and familiar with the culture expressed through it. The continued study of Latin in universities today may be justified on other grounds (the preservation of European culture and the study of its continuity since Roman times). But there can be little doubt that the proportion of students in English and Welsh universities studying the classics in the last century and in the first half of this century was higher than could be justified by reference to any contemporary social need. On the general question of the nature of knowledge, see Young, M. F. D. (ed.) (1971), and especially chapter 2, Bernstein, B. 'On the classification and framing of educational knowledge'.

courses, allowing a varying degree of choice between 'modules', so that the student puts together his/her own total educational package.[106] Even this modest change allows greater flexibility in meeting the demands of individual students as well as of employers and other external groups. Although nothing suggests that Crosland had this in mind when he referred to the socially responsive character of the new polytechnics, we should note that government itself is no longer averse to the principle.[107]

4.19 But this concept of social responsiveness may be pushed further: some argue that, provided that the standard of the final qualification is maintained, the student should be the principal or sole determiner of the content of his or her studies, many or all of which may be project-based, thus entailing the use of concepts or knowledge deemed traditionally to be part of several disparate disciplines. Some call this 'independent study', although it might better be called 'guided independent study', because the student may always turn (and indeed is encouraged to turn) to teachers for help and advice. Again, there is nothing revolutionary about the concept; some American institutions have for some years awarded degrees on the basis of independent study. In 1978, only one British higher education institution, the North-East London Polytechnic, offered a DipHE and a degree by independent study.

4.20 The underlying philosophy is that education (perhaps at all levels) should no longer be concerned with the transmission of a fixed and inherited body of knowledge but rather with the development of the competence (vocational and social) of the individual. It is the ability *to do* that is important rather than the ability to reproduce a predetermined quantum of 'knowledge'..[108]

4.21 New patterns of education are demanded both by rapid technological change and persistent advocacy of the extension of participatory democracy.[109] Yet there is little trace of this new philosophy in the speeches of Crosland or in official publications. It is not, therefore, what was meant, when the polytechnics were designated, by 'social responsiveness'. What seems significant here is that change in British education occurs as much because of the individual initiatives of teachers in the system, and sometimes because of external pressures upon the system, as it does by reason of Government fiat. In a polycentralist system (see Unit 2), the evolution of policy is not simply the consequence of lucubrations within the Department of Education and Science, and announced policies may lead to results not foreseen by those who devised them.

[106]This is the basis of much of American higher education.

[107]Department of Education and Science (1972a) *Education: a framework for expansion*, paragraphs 108 and 112.

[108]Even the very traditional Robbins Report (1963) said: 'What is taught should be taught in such a way as to promote the general powers of the mind', (paragraph 26). It then went on to confuse the issue by describing the product of this process as 'cultivated' men and women. The concept of a 'cultivated' person seems to relate to an old-fashioned notion of social competence of little relevance to modern democratic society and quite irrelevant to vocational ability and flexibility.

[109]See Unit 9, section 4, in The Open University (1978) E361 *Education and the Urban Environment*. The general argument is best stated by Burgess, T. (1977). At its extreme the argument is not dissimilar from that of Illich, I. D. (1971), with his society of teachers and learners, except that Illich wished to de-institutionalize the learning process, whereas Burgess sees rather open and flexible institutions responding sensitively to the individual demands of learners. Advocacy of participatory democracy came in the Bullock Report (1976) on industrial democracy and in the Taylor Report (1977) on school government.

IS 'SOCIAL CONTROL' THE SAME AS LEA CONTROL?

4.22 Let us now return to what Regan calls Crosland's third argument—that the participation of local government in higher education is a valuable feature of British democracy. At Woolwich, as in the later Lancaster speech quoted by Regan, Crosland spoke about 'social control' as well as social responsiveness. He went on to say: 'It is further desirable that local government, responsible for the schools and having started and built up so many institutions of higher education, should maintain a reasonable stake in higher education.' We must ask here, firstly, how 'social control' comes to be interpreted as control by local government and, secondly, if we accept Crosland's general argument, what he can have meant by 'a reasonable stake in higher education'.

4.23 Presumably Crosland meant by 'social control' a system of government that gives ultimate power to democratically elected representatives of society, as opposed to the self-governing or autonomous system found in British universities. It does not follow from this that local authorities are best fitted to exercise such social control. An alternative would be direct control by the Department of Education and Science. In the United States, State universities (many of which have their origin in nineteenth century land-grant colleges to which the State made a grant of land and funds in order that they might develop agriculture through education and research) are controlled by the Governments of the individual States. The federal system in the United States is the equivalent of direct control in Britain by central government, rather than by local government. In Canada also, institutions that have functions broadly similar to those of the polytechnics[110] are the responsibility of the provincial government, rather than of any organ of local government.

4.24 The key to Crosland's argument, therefore, appears to lie in his statement that local government is 'responsible for the schools' and has 'started and built up so many institutions of higher education'. It is hard to see how local-government responsibility for the schools, which serve a purely local population (unlike many institutions of higher education), is strictly relevant to Crosland's thesis. It may be argued that the syllabus of the schools is partly or largely determined by the universities, both through the entrance requirements which they set and through their (at least theoretical) control of the GCE Examining Boards.

4.25 Although, in the Crosland scheme, the qualifications offered by the new polytechnics were to be externally validated (by the Council for National Academic Awards or by other external examining bodies, not the universities), it was not obvious how the location of responsibility for school education and for higher education within the same local authority would facilitate its academic integration. The argument, therefore, appears to have turned upon the fact that local authorities had founded and supported institutions of higher education, many of which had subsequently escaped from their control. Although Crosland did not say so, it is clear enough that the removal of the CATS from local authority control, the most recent example of this process, was in his mind when he uttered these words.

4.26 That is, Crosland seems to have been enunciating an essentially political argument. The British system of educational government, if it is to function effectively, entails a wide measure of cooperation between central and local government, because, as you will have seen throughout this course, the Education Acts place as many duties and responsibilities upon local government as they do upon central. When Crosland delivered his speech, central government had taken over the funding and control of the CATs three

[110]Adelman (1973) calls them 'social service station' universities (see section 6).

years before. He was himself about to issue a Circular requesting local authorities to submit plans for the comprehensive reorganization of secondary education (Circular 10/65), which might be expected to give rise to political controversy between the DES and some local authorities.

4.27 In short, if alternatives to local authority control of the new polytechnics were ever mooted in the Department they were never publicly discussed, for fear of the offence this might cause among LEAs. The decision rested upon hard political considerations, and not solely upon a philosophy of educational administration.

A REASONABLE LEA STAKE IN HIGHER EDUCATION

4.28 What would be a 'reasonable' stake for local government in higher education? The two hundred or so institutions that, as we have seen, offer part-time courses of higher education only (most of them being concerned mainly with part-time and full-time education of 16s to 19s) would seem clearly to belong to the local authority sector. Their higher-education courses are likely to be mounted in response to local need and demand, emanating from local industry, commerce and other external employing agencies. Even the hundred or so colleges that are primarily concerned with lower-level work, but offer some full-time or sandwich courses of higher education, are also likely to be mainly local in their orientation, although some of their courses may attract students from areas of other local authorities and sometimes from all parts of the country. Doubts may arise, however, about those colleges that are almost solely concerned with higher education, much or most of it full-time or sandwich. Advanced full-time courses are likely to attract students from all over Britain, and perhaps from other countries, even when they are related directly to a local industry.

4.29 The argument may be illustrated from the university sector. Birmingham University's degree course in brewing, and Bradford University's work in the field of textiles, do not attract students purely from the brewing districts of the West Midlands and the textile districts of West Yorkshire. Similarly, in the polytechnics, Hatfield's expertise in aeronautical engineering is attractive not only to students from Hertfordshire, and Plymouth's work in maritime studies does not prove of interest solely to Devonians. Therefore, unless other evidence can be adduced to demonstrate the value of local authority control of such institutions of higher education, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that 'reasonable' is also a political term, concerned more with what is or was acceptable to the LEAs collectively than with educational philosophy or strategy.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY CONTROL

4.30 Regan (pp. 185–6) discusses briefly some of the criticisms of local-government involvement in the control of further education. For the reasons given in paragraphs 4.22 to 4.24, we may doubt his statement that 'to exclude local government from administrative involvement in post-school education would be to create a unitary system'. On the other hand, Regan without doubt is correct in asserting that the reforms in the government of colleges that followed the Weaver Report of 1966 have greatly reduced effective local authority control of the colleges (see section 5). The Instruments and Articles of Government of the polytechnics all broadly followed the guidance issued by the Department, which suggested that the maintaining authority should normally have no more than one-third of the seats on the governing body of its own polytechnic.[111] In any event, as we shall see, academic

[111]Department of Education and Science (1967) *Notes for Guidance on the Government and Academic Organization of Polytechnics*.

decisions are reserved largely for the Academic Board of the institution, comprised as it is of representatives of the staff. Other interests represented on the governing body are industry, commerce, the trades unions, local schools and, of course, the staff and students of the institution.

4.31 The principal controls residing with the local authority are therefore two only. The LEA can prevent the submission of a proposal for a new course, but rarely does so, the decision usually being left to the Regional Advisory Council and the Regional Staff Inspector of the Department. Equally, it can prune the budget of the polytechnic or college. But, if some authorities were to spend little time upon the budgets of the institutions for which they were theoretically responsible, that would be explicable primarily by the pooling system (see section 3).

4.32 In 1975 the Teacher Training pool was amalgamated with the Advanced Further Education pool, through which non-teacher-training institutions of higher education 'maintained' by LEAs had been financed since 1957. The old AFE pool differed from the Teacher Training pool in the formula upon the basis of which local authorities contributed to it took account of the percentage of the rateable value that was industrial or commercial in their areas; otherwise, the principles were the same. Both the old system and the new meant that everybody paid for what everyone else spent. Doubts about the viability, administratively and financially, of a system wherein individual authorities were said to be responsible for individual institutions, but all LEAs collectively paid to maintain them, led to the creation of the Oakes Committee, properly called the Working Group on the Management of Higher Education in the Maintained Sector, the report of which we shall now examine. That the Committee was established at all (in 1977) is the clearest proof that Anthony Crosland and his advisers had not conclusively demonstrated that control by local government was the most efficient means of ensuring that national needs were met in higher education.

THE OAKES REPORT

CRITICISMS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR

4.33 Several distinct criticisms of the existing system of financing and controlling public sector higher education led to the establishment of the Oakes Committee. First, advanced further education (AFE), as we have suggested, largely meets a national need, to some degree a regional need, and only to a lesser extent a specifically local need, yet public sector establishments running higher education courses are the responsibility of their 'maintaining' LEAs; management responsibility for what is essentially national or regional provision thus lies locally. Second, 'maintaining' local authorities, in fact, do not pay for higher education courses run in their colleges, which are funded through the pool to which all LEAs contribute. Third, the formula upon which the AFE pooling system distributes costs among local authorities itself embodies weaknesses. It takes account of the location of industry and commerce, but productive industry benefits the nation as a whole not simply the areas in which it is situated.

4.34 The fourth criticism was that the system of ensuring coordination of AFE provision at regional level was inadequate. The Regional Advisory Councils for Further Education were advisory bodies only, in which the representatives of local authorities often competed for a desirable or desired course. The standard work on further education in England and Wales, that of Professor L. M. Cantor and G. Roberts, says:

> The system for approving advanced courses is one based upon competitive bidding whereby colleges submit proposals which are considered by the

RAC with, as yet, relatively little knowledge of the national situation or national needs to guide them.

(Cantor, L. M. and Roberts, G. (1971))

They point out that successive recommendations that RACs should play a more positive role have had little effect. They continue: 'Under such a system it is very difficult for the RACs to play their proper part in effectively controlling resources and planning ahead.' (Cantor and Roberts (1971))

4.35 The consequences of this (and this is the fifth criticism of the system existing hitherto) was that, because of the weakness of the RACs, some ultimate decision-making power must reside elsewhere. It lay with the DES, operating through the Inspectorate. Once the RAC has made a recommendation, it has been passed to the Regional Staff Inspector (RSI) who, acting on behalf of the Department, has approved or refused to allow the commencement of a course. Letters on approval of courses normally begin: 'Sir, I am directed by the Secretary of State . . .'. Save on the rarest of occasions, the Secretary of State and other Ministers within the department have had no knowledge of the decision, which was purely that of the Inspectorate. This may seem a less than ideal way, in a democratic society, of reconciling the competing claims of elected authorities.

4.36 A sixth criticism of the system existing in 1978 was that the responsibility of the Inspectorate extended also to the closure of courses that failed to recruit an adequate number of students. Since 1967, the general rule has been that a course should recruit at least fifteen students in its first year, and twenty-four students in each successive year of its operation. If it does not, then the RSI has had to consider whether the course should be closed and students moved elsewhere. But management by course control is of its nature fragmented and incoherent. If a course fails to recruit the required numbers in any year, there may be little financial gain in stopping the course and transferring the students elsewhere. If the course stands alongside other courses at an advanced level (whether full-time or part-time) which use the same staff and physical resources, then marginal financial savings in current expenditure stemming from the closure of the course may be gained at the cost of under-utilization of buildings, equipment and staff. Elsewhere, a free-standing course, unsupported by other provision in the same academic area, may recruit well, but be singularly uneconomic in its claim upon institutional resources. Course control is thus an inadequate tool for managing the AFE system.

THE OAKES RECOMMENDATIONS

4.37 The Oakes Group reported in March, 1978.[112] We print as Appendix 2 the summary of the recommendations of the Committee: you should read this now before proceeding further with this unit. In doing so, you should remember that the Oakes Group was itself composed largely of representatives of the local-authority associations (i.e. of the LEAs collectively) and of the teacher associations, whose members work within further and higher education in the public sector.[113] The Group also included two representatives of the Committee of Directors of Polytechnics (CDP), who were assumed to have argued for greater independence of the polytechnics from the local authorities, in opposition to the view of LEA representatives. You should spend only twenty-five minutes on this reading.

[112]Department of Education and Science (1978b) *Report of the Working Group on the Management of Higher Education in the Maintained Sector.*

[113]The National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) and the Association of Principals of Colleges.

4.38 The Oakes recommendations themselves provoked dispute. Some argued that the creation of a National Body (Recommendation ii) was itself undesirable, because it would destroy local control, and hence the 'social responsiveness', of public-sector institutions. Others contended that the Report did not go far enough, because it gave an unduly powerful voice to the LEAs in the National Body.[114] Others, again, maintained that there should be a separation between the financing and control of those colleges that were essentially local in character and those that served primarily a regional or national need. Nevertheless, the Report undoubtedly came to grips with the weaknesses in the existing system of control, which we set out in paragraphs 4.33 to 4.36.

4.39 Oakes attempted to deal with the first criticism of the existing system, which we set out in paragraph 4.33, by more clearly defining and dividing the elements of management responsibility. The new National Body would coordinate AFE by advice offered to both the Secretary of State and the LEAs, taking account of national need, and examining the proposed educational programmes submitted to it by LEAs and institutions (and the cost of these). Its 'advice' would have teeth, for it would allocate funds for recurrent expenditure (Oakes recommendation ii and paragraph 13.3.) It would thus exercise a negative control over AFE developments, restraining over-ambitious authorities and colleges. Its positive developmental role would seem to turn upon the willingness of LEAs to respond to encouragement backed by cash. In this, it would be like the UGC, and might be expected to enjoy similar success. Meanwhile, at the local level, individual LEAs would 'retain overall responsibility for the good management' of their colleges, but the colleges would have 'maximum freedom to manage their own affairs' (Oakes recommendation xii and paragraph 13.5.) In particular, the governing body of a college would have greater freedom to incur expenditure (on staff or goods) without detailed interference by the LEA but within a 'closed budget' (recommendations xiii and xvii). In this system, efficiency could be rewarded and inefficiency penalised (Oakes recommendations xvii(b) and xiv and paragraph 13.5).

4.40 The second criticism of the existing system that we identified (paragraph 4.33 in this unit) would be met by making maintaining LEAs directly responsible for first 5 per cent, then 10 per cent, and later perhaps 15 per cent of the cost of higher education in their colleges (Oakes recommendation ix). This would remove the main weakness of the pooling of costs, because the burden upon many LEAs of funding from their own resources even 15 per cent of the expenditure of a large polytechnic or college would be heavy. Pooling could thus continue, but faults in the formula (our third criticism) would remain until a way could be found by the LEAs' own Pooling Committee of changing it (Oakes recommendation x and paragraph 13.4). Sudden change might heavily penalise some authorities.

4.41 Regional coordination of AFE—which we saw as a fourth weakness in the system (paragraph 4.34)—would be entrusted to new RACs (Oakes recommendation xxv). Although they would still be essentially advisory bodies, the existence of the National Body, with financial teeth, would give them a new lever on LEAs and colleges. The colleges would have an incentive to resolve rationally their competing claims at regional level, lest the resolution were made for them at national level (cf. the delicately phrased Oakes paragraph 13.6). At the same time, another problem could be solved

[114]Particular attention was attracted by recommendation viii, that local authority representatives on the National Body, if voting unanimously but in a minority, should be able to insist that the issue in question should be referred for decision to the Secretary of State. This was perceived, firstly, as a denial of the principle of majority voting and, secondly, as an absurdity, if it were designed to preserve local authority autonomy, because final decision by the Secretary of State could not conceivably contribute to that end.

(one that we outlined in section 3): the planning of teacher education, both initial and in-service, could be integrated regionally with that of the rest of AFE, from which most of it was no longer separable (Oakes recommendations xxv and xxvi). The pious hope was expressed that universities in each region would 'cooperate' with the new RACs, to get 'cross-binary' coordination; but, here, Oakes suggested no mechanism for ensuring such cooperation.

4.42 The fifth and sixth weaknesses we identified in the present system of management of AFE (paragraphs 4.35 and 4.36) related to course control, exercised by HMI. The proposed power of the new National Body to allocate finance to authorities, having examined educational programmes submitted to it, would eliminate the necessity for separate course control. At the same time, the new direct financial burden falling upon LEAs in respect of AFE in their colleges, and the suggested 'closed budget' system, would give authorities and colleges alike a powerful incentive to drop courses that attracted few students and could not otherwise be justified.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE OAKES REPORT

4.43 The Government accepted all the main recommendations of the Oakes Report. It decided, however, that action must await legislation, permitting the imposition of the new direct charge of 5 to 15 per cent of the cost of its own higher education provision upon each maintaining LEA. An Education Bill introduced into Parliament at the end of 1978 (and still undergoing discussion when this unit was completed) included this proposal. The Bill would also establish statutorily two new Advanced Further Education Councils, one for England and one for Wales. These were to be the Oakes 'National Body', a separate Council for Wales resulting from the then Government's commitment to the devolution or decentralization of many powers and responsibilities to separate Welsh bodies (cf. Oakes recommendation xxxii). The Councils were to be empowered to advise the Secretary of State and LEAs 'on any matter concerned with the provision of advanced further education in establishments maintained or assisted by such authorities.'

4.44 All the members of the Councils were to be appointed by the Secretary of State (contrast the implication of Oakes recommendation iii)—but after consultation with the local authority associations and other bodies. There was, therefore, no reason to believe that the composition of the Councils would differ widely from that suggested by Oakes. Other details concerning the operation of the new system were omitted from the Bill, because they did not require legislation, save that it provided that the Councils should advise the Secretary of State about the proportion of their own higher education expenditure to be borne directly by maintaining LEAs in any year, and on the apportionment of pooled moneys among them.

4.45 In one other respect, the Bill went beyond the Oakes Report. The new Councils were also to advise the Secretary of State 'as he may require' on anything to do with AFE outside colleges maintained by LEAs. This provision was intended to permit the voluntary colleges, historically concerned solely with teacher education but now diversifying into 'general' higher education (see section 3) to be linked into the new system for the national coordination of AFE (cf. Oakes paragraph 13.7). For the first time, a single national *system* of AFE in England (and of one in Wales) seemed possible, with one central coordinating body, despite the continued stake of the LEAs and the voluntary bodies in financing and running individual colleges.[115]

[115] The Oakes Working Group was not empowered to consider colleges in Scotland, and the Government's Bill did not extend to that country.

4.46 The public sector of higher education had one of its origins in the local growth of higher education courses (often part-time, and subsequently sometimes full-time) designed to meet local need, which became courses serving a regional or national need. Its second origin was in teacher education and training, again a largely local system of provision to meet local need, but subsequently a national system. The two have become amalgamated (see section 3). Together they form some two-fifths of the total higher education system in England and Wales. In recent years, Government has made several attempts to declare a philosophy for these institutions, and alongside it a suitable system of management and financing.

4.47 Recent change began in 1965–6 with the policy of concentrating into thirty institutions, to be known as polytechnics, applied and vocational studies at higher-educational level. This policy was partially abandoned with the 1972 White Paper, which began the process of merging the former colleges of education, some into the university sector, but many more into the public sector of AFE. Governments throughout the period have espoused a view that maintained colleges should remain part of the local authority sector but, at the same time, have established systems of government and management for individual institutions, which have made them in large measure free of constraints imposed by their own 'maintaining' LEA. At the same time, the pooling system has ensured that public sector institutions have been able to find the resources for growth which might have been denied them if they were genuinely a direct burden upon their own LEAs. By British tradition, Governments do not interfere in the curriculum and syllabus of institutions at any educational level, and have confined themselves to general statements about the role of colleges. In consequence, innovation in order to achieve genuine 'social responsiveness' has come (when it has come at all) from the institutions themselves.

4.48 It would seem to follow from this that Governments have either lacked, or been unable to enforce, a coherent strategy for the development of the public sector of higher education. In part, this has been because of unforeseen and unforeseeable factors—notably the decline in the birth-rate, necessitating a smaller teaching force than had earlier been suggested, and the decline in the rate of increase of those qualified for, and seeking, higher education. In part, however, it has been a consequence of the weakness of central government itself within the English and Welsh education system. Without upsetting the balance of power between central government and the local authorities, it has not been possible to dictate a role for colleges within the public sector, including the polytechnics, although the Government has given some indications of what it would wish them to do.

4.49 Central government fixes parameters within which growth may take place—the capital building programme permitted to local authorities, the qualifications that normally will be expected of students entering a course qualifying for a mandatory student grant,[116] and the number of overseas students that institutions should aim to admit. But the content and organization of courses are essentially a matter for the staff of institutions, and the institutions' openness to outside demand—whether expressed by

[116]Although by the terms of the 1975 Education Act any student admitted to a degree course is entitled to a mandatory grant irrespective of prior educational qualifications—a change designed to aid mature students, because 18-year-olds will not normally be admitted to higher-education courses in any event, unless they have five GCE passes, two of which are at 'A' level or their SCE equivalents.

employers, potential students, or other interest groups—is again for them alone. Local education authorities have some say, if they wish to exercise it, in the financing and the pattern of course provision in the institutions that they maintain. We have to recognize that the public sector (meaning the institutions, their staff and their maintaining LEAs collectively) is almost as independent of central government as is the university sector. It remains to be seen whether the proposed new 'Oakes' system, with stronger central coordination, but continuing LEA, institutional and teacher participation in it, will change this judgement.

4.50 The public sector has shown greater initiative in the last decade than have the universities in mounting courses outside the traditional English and Welsh moulds, whether at degree or DipHE level. A higher proportion of its students pursue vocational courses, and directly enter industry or commerce. On the other hand, the 1966 policy of concentrating full-time AFE in the polytechnics, which would be vocationally oriented institutions, now seems to have been abandoned. Public-sector institutions remain on average smaller than universities, and usually have poorer institutional facilities—libraries, student unions, staff common rooms and the like. Otherwise it would seem that differences between the two sectors are more a matter of degree than of a sharp distinction in educational philosophy. There is still a distinction between the internal systems of government of institutions in the two sectors, and that is what we shall examine in section 5.

5 The internal management of universities and colleges

THE UNIVERSITIES

5.1 The allocation of a block grant for recurrent expenditure permits universities to determine their own policy and development, within constraints, some of which we analysed in section 2. As we have seen, the University Grants Committee exercises control of individual building allocations, as well as giving certain guidelines on the breakdown of student numbers and upon the pattern of course provision. The university is also dependent for some of its activities upon private income, or upon grants—whether from public or private bodies—for the sponsorship of specific research projects, and upon fee income from students (or in most cases from public authorities, channelled through students.) The supreme decision-making body within the university is usually called a Council (although you should note that Oxford and Cambridge are quite different from other universities, and that Scottish universities use a different terminology). Council is composed of some members of the university's senior academic staff and rather more 'lay' members, drawn from outside. This body exercises financial control. It is, however, the Senate, which is composed of academics from within the university (normally, but not universally, with the majority from the ranks of the professors, the senior grade of academic appointment), that determines purely academic and educational matters. A few senior administrators may also sit on Senate, and there may now be some student representation on Council and perhaps on Senate also.

5.2 Beneath Council and Senate there are always committees dealing with or advising on specific policy areas, some of them committees of Council or sub-committees of those committees, and others responsible in a similar manner to the Senate. The number of committees and their relationship varies from university to university. Thus, in some universities, large numbers of committees may report directly to Senate. In others, however, their recommendations are filtered through a much smaller number of committees of Senate before they reach Senate itself. There will normally be a committee or board for each Faculty or School of study, but academic organization also differs between universities. On all of these committees members of academic staff will serve. The most senior academic member of the university is the Vice-Chancellor, who is its functional head. Much of his power, which may be very great, derives from his chairmanship of Senate and of its major committees. The Chancellorship is an honorific appointment only, and Council will normally be chaired by a Pro-Chancellor, from outside the university, whose power may also be considerable.[117] We have then a system of government by committee with power residing in part with the chairmen of committees and the administrators who service those committees, but informally rather than formally.

5.3 It is at the level of the subject department that the principle of government by committee often breaks down. Here, the professor heading the department may rule it with a rod of iron, although professorial styles and departmental practice vary widely. In some universities, there is now a system of rotating chairmanship of the department (a practice common in the United States of America), wherein the chairman may be elected for a fixed term either from the professoriate alone, or from a wider group of senior staff within the

[117] In Scotland, the Vice-Chancellor is often called the Principal, and the ancient Scottish universities also have a Rector, elected by the student body, part of whose role is to defend the interests of his or her electorate.

department. Either system can be combined with a formal or informal committee structure within the department, perhaps with all staff members participating in decisions, or perhaps with informal consultation procedures. Nevertheless, the view of Hugh Livingstone seems in general correct:

> Two points must strike the observer in examining the organisational structure of a university. First, the division of work is not based upon the hierarchical relationship normally found in large organisations. Not only is much of the work functionally divided between Council and Senate, despite the former's innately superior position, but it is to a large extent evolved from one committee to another. Secondly, there is a clear break between the non-hierarchical structure above the level of the department and the existence of hierarchy within departments.
>
> (Livingstone, H. (1974), p. 51)

WHAT KIND OF ORGANIZATION IS A UNIVERSITY?

5.4 Universities, of course, are in some respects similar to many other forms of large organization. They consist of people, money, materials and buildings, the use of which must be managed in order to accomplish the functions and objectives of the institution. They interact with other organizations and individuals in the outside world—ranging from governments to individual students. They must negotiate with their staff, as well as with external agencies, and their task is to retain stability while permitting change, innovation and enterprise. On the other hand, they differ sharply from other forms of large organization—from a government department, the principal function of which is to provide a service or services, or from a large industrial corporation, the principal task of which is to maximize its profits over a period (whatever other functions it may have in addition). Universities undertake teaching, but they are also research organizations, and they provide a public service; it is not easy to say which function predominates over the others or what weight within the internal decision-making process is to be given to the achievement of each.

5.5 The 'raw material' universities consume within the teaching function cannot be controlled by them with precision; the quality of the student intake may vary for reasons largely outside their own control—government policy to expand the university sector, or a change in the quality of teaching within the schools in particular disciplines, for example. Nor can their 'output' be measured with precision. On the teaching side, student wastage rates and the proportion of students achieving a given class of degree give some indication, but this is only an exact indication if we assume that the standard of both intake and of examining, and the requirements of the syllabus, have remained unchanged over a period. The value of research output is exceedingly difficult to quantify, not least because the spin-off from research work in industrial, commercial or social service terms may come many years later.

5.6 Further, unlike industrial firms or government departments, universities are not much concerned with the question of whether they will survive in some form or other; no Government has yet proposed the closure of several universities as part of its higher education policy. Nor is the pattern of the work of universities even; the three-term principle means that much decision-making peaks at intervals throughout the year, with troughs between the peaks. The management of universities is thus not precisely similar to the management of other large organizations, even if we neglect the committee structure through which much of it takes place.

5.7 We cannot consider here all of the management problems to which the organizational structure of universities gives rise, but we may note some of the more important. First, it is often implied in discussion of the universities that the autonomy of the institution and the academic freedom of its members march hand-in-hand. Yet their management structure clearly demonstrates that the two can be in conflict. The Council, which is dominated by lay members, determines overall financial allocations within the university. The ability to teach what one will and to research into what one will is determined in large measure by the amount of money made available to individual members of staff or their departments. Thus, even if we neglect the hierarchical system of management that often operates within the department, the individual member of academic staff does not enjoy absolute freedom in respect of either of his or her two main activities, despite the absence of external political or other interference in the affairs of the university itself. The problem is compounded by the mixture of roles he is required to play. He is an employed member of the staff of the university. He may however equally be a member of the Senate, or even of the Council, and is quite likely to be a member of one of the university's many committees. He may thus take part in the determination of policy, but is also required by his contract to carry out the policy once it has been determined. Such tensions may be found in any 'participatory' form of government, but they are acute in the universities.

5.8 That the problem does not normally present itself in this sharp form is partly the result of allowing the individual academic to teach what he is required to teach in the way in which he chooses to teach it, and partly the result of the custom observed by the institution and by his academic superiors of not interfering with his research—within broad limits. The limits vary, of course: some science professors, and others, rely heavily upon their junior staff for the advancement of their own personal research programmes (perhaps inevitably at a time when team research is essential in many academic areas), and some are more prescriptive than others about the way in which a discipline may be taught.

5.9 But, in any case, 'liberalism' here must give rise to doubts about the efficiency of each university in achieving its overall teaching and research objectives. Policy objectives may be laid down through a 'participatory' system of government, and the means of achieving them determined partly through financial allocations, and partly through their detailed embodiment in syllabuses and in research programmes. However, if the achievement of these objectives is *then* left to the loosely controlled activity of individuals, then it is inevitable that there must be occasions when the two halves of the process are not fully harmonized. This is not to argue that a rigidly hierarchical system of mnagement is the best way to encourage effort, let alone enterprise, or that face-to-face teaching or individual research is best conducted under strict supervision within narrowly defined rules. But it is important to draw attention to the problem.

5.10 The difficulty is not eased by the increase in academic knowledge, or by changing approaches to the education of students—such as the 'learner centred approach' which we discussed in section 4. Whatever his own desire to specialize in a narrow branch of his discipline, the individual academic is faced with the problem of teaching or being available to teach an ever-wider range of knowledge to his students, and increasingly with demands for particular studies made upon him by them, as well as by his academic superiors or the 'management' of the university. Again, there is a conflict between his own 'academic freedom', narrowly perceived, and the demands of the autonomous institution within which he works, and the teaching objectives it sets for him.

5.11 It is arguable that this problem might be partly overcome by the use of standard teaching material, collectively produced by academics working in several different institutions, and used for those elements of courses that are, by virtue of their subject matter, broadly similar in any event. This, however, is to question not only the extreme form of the doctrine of 'academic freedom' but institutional autonomy also. Efficiency, defined as the most effective use of available resources in order to achieve the objectives of the university system as a whole, is perhaps not wholly compatible with the present mode of management of the individual universities.[118]

RESEARCH

5.12 Even if we neglect the public service function of the universities, which is most conspicuous in their extra-mural departments and in teacher education, their research function produces additional problems in the management of resources. As we have seen (in section 2) the UGC recurrent grant is meant to provide general support for research as well as for teaching. What proportion of it is used for each function is, however, a matter for collective and for individual decision within each university. At the departmental level, more money may be found for research by cutting at the margin time and effort devoted to teaching, or by allowing less student choice of subject matter in order to facilitate teaching in larger groups. Departments enjoying large research grants, whether from publicly funded Research Councils or directly from government departments, or from private agencies, may be able to purchase equipment and hire staff denied to other departments and subsequently use them in part to improve the performance of their teaching functions. A university's unit teaching costs (expenditure per student per annum) thus give little indication either of the efficiency of its teaching or of the breakdown of expenditure between teaching and research. Nor again, because policies elaborated within the committee structure of the university are of necessity translated into practice by departments and by individuals working within them, can we be certain that the desired balance between teaching and research is always achieved.

WEAKNESSES OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

5.13 In any event, there are well-known weaknesses of any system of government by committee. The preparation and distribution of detailed papers to a substantial number of people, and the consideration of them, consumes time and resources. Some members of a committee must always, on any given subject, be better informed than others. Discussion means delay, especially when a decision has to pass through several committees, whether arranged hierarchically or in parallel. Finally, conflict of views can often only be resolved by compromise and compromise may sometimes get the worst of all worlds. Since some decisions must of necessity be taken quickly, there often grows up a small cabal within the committee which exercises effective power (though this may sometimes be avoided by the formal delegation of executive power to the chairman); we may then begin to doubt whether this is a genuinely 'participatory' committee system at all.

5.14 In universities, these deficiencies are exacerbated not only by the separation of the financial powers of Council and its committees from the academic powers of Senate and its committees, but also by the UGC system of grant,

[118] In other countries, the argument is sometimes heard that university autonomy depends essentially upon the collective independence of the universities from the state, and that the universities should therefore determine among themselves which of them indulges in what activity, and to what degree they shall operate together (as in the production of common teaching materials). It may be doubted whether British universities are yet willing to accept such a doctrine.

which, as we have seen, separates recurrent grant from grant for equipment and for buildings. If a university is preparing its submission for recurrent grant to the UGC, then it must also consider what buildings and equipment its new academic proposals will demand. These will normally have to be considered internally by committees separate from those charged purely with the preparation of academic plans, or with the examination of the recurrent cost implications of these plans. Again, marrying together these planning processes may be a time-consuming exercise. Further, the time-scales for decision in the internal and external management processes can here interact in an unfortunate manner. Even when the quinquennial grant system was working effectively, a UGC decision upon a building grant could pre-empt any decision made by a university about where it would wish to see the main weight of its academic development over the next five years. Thus, a university might find that it was necessary for its committees concerned with buildings and equipment to put in bids before Senate had fully considered the lines of academic development that it would like to see reflected in the UGC quinquennial grant.

5.15 The greater the size and diversity of the university, the more complex will be its problems. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the course of the past fifteen years the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Birmingham and London have conducted major reviews of their government and management structures, and other universities have carried through more piecemeal reforms. At the same time, there have been demands for increased participation in the internal government of universities, first from academic staff, then from students, and finally in the 1970s from non-academic staff, although non-academic staff often prefer regular negotiating procedures, replacing the paternalistic system which often operated in the past. Perhaps the extreme example of the outcome of conceding to all groups within a university the right to a say in its government is the Senate of the Open University, with a membership of some 700—which means that many important decisions are effectively taken by other committees of that university.

5.16 Efficient participatory government of multi-purpose institutions, dependent largely upon external financing, demands at the least (i) the production and wide dissemination of detailed information (wastage rates, use of staff time, spare physical capacity available, etc.) so that decisions are not taken in ignorance of relevant facts; (ii) constant reconsideration of the committee structure and the timing of committee meetings, in order to ensure both that as many decisions as possible are taken at the most appropriate level and that there is a logical flow of decisions in the formation and implementation of policy; (iii) the use of certain modern management techniques, borrowed from other large organizations, such as critical path analysis—a technique designed to reveal the order in which decisions and actions must be taken in order to achieve the evolution and implementation of a policy in the shortest possible time. It is for these reasons that the management of universities has for some years been in a state of flux and is becoming ever more sophisticated.[119]

THE PUBLIC SECTOR

5.17 The most conspicuous features of the government of universities are:

(i) the principle of government by committee;

(ii) the great freedom enjoyed by each university itself in policy-making, and above all its freedom from interference by outside bodies in matters of detail;

[119]See, for example, Fielden, J. and Lockwood, G. (1973).

(iii) the involvement of academic staff in policy-making at every level.

The first of these principles was introduced into the public sector (or rather, widely extended within it, since to some degree it existed before) by the 'Weaver' reforms of the later 1960s (referred to in section 3). Each polytechnic and college running higher education courses has its own governing body, upon which representatives of the maintaining LEA are in a minority, and there is an Academic Board, composed of academic members of staff, which corresponds to the university Senate. Below it will be several committees responsible for particular aspects of the academic development of the polytechnic or college, and once again there is a varying pattern at departmental level—with the Head of Department sometimes exercising autocratic power within the policy constraints set from above and sometimes seeking to involve in departmental decisions his junior members of staff.

5.18 In public sector colleges, there are not normally many sub-committees of the governing body, and it is significant that one of the recommendations of the Oakes Committee (recommendation xvi (b), and cf. xix) was that joint planning committees of the governing body and the Academic Board might be established. Without these, there is an ever-present danger that academic and financial planning may become divorced, with the Academic Board producing proposals for new courses or research projects that bear little relation to the finance likely to be available, or to the physical capacity of the institution, and the governing body manifesting a lack of educational and academic expertise in making financial judgements.

5.19 Most Articles of Government made in the post-Weaver period give an ambivalent role to the academic head of the institution. He is usually to be responsible for the internal management and discipline of the college, and the most common title of the heads of polytechnics, namely Director, accurately reflects this position. But what is not immediately clear is the intended extent of such a role, when the Academic Board is responsible for all academic and educational affairs, and the governing body for financial decisions. The governing body, of course, may delegate specific powers to the Director or Principal, but this is not always done with total clarity. The attitude of heads of polytechnics and colleges to their jobs thus seems to vary widely, some seeking to provide leadership by persuasion and negotiation, others maintaining a more old-fashioned autocratic stance.

5.20 Rarely is the position of Director or Principal exactly analogous to that of a university Vice-Chancellor. To take an example, in one university in which the present author worked, staff promotions were recommended by a committee elected by the Senate, and its recommendations were formally ratified by the Council. In a polytechnic where he worked, on the other hand, staff promotions were recommended by a committee of the Assistant Directors; the Director then made his own amendments to the list and passed them to the governing body.

5.21 The explanation seems to be that the post-Weaver system of government of public sector colleges is an uneasy compromise between the hierarchical system that previously obtained in most of the public sector, and the university system. The university principle of government by committee has been accepted, but it co-exists with the earlier tradition of autocratic and hierarchical management. Burgess and Pratt describe the attempt made by the DES to import new structures of government into the polytechnics as 'an attempt to import university independence into the public sector of higher education.' They continue: 'Naturally this will have important implications for the relationships between staff themselves.'[120] This is undoubtedly right: but the consequences of a compromise settlement may not always be wholly

[120]Burgess, T. and Pratt, J. (1971), p. 96.

predictable. That is why it was necessary for the Oakes Group to seek to define more clearly the relationships of LEAs, governing bodies, academic boards and principals (recommendations xii–xxiv).

EXTERNAL FINANCIAL CONTROLS AND THEIR INTERNAL EFFECT

5.22 We must now examine the application to the public sector of the second and third of the principles of university government we listed in paragraph 5.17, beginning with the effect on internal government of external financial controls. We have seen that AFE is financed through an LEA 'pool', but that the duty still lies on each maintaining LEA to examine, before approval, the annual estimates of its own colleges. They may do so with varying degrees of care, and this could help to explain wide variations in standards of provision. For example, staff : student ratios in polytechnics still differ widely, despite attempts since the early 1970s by the Pooling Committee of the LEAs to ensure that they came broadly into line with each other.[121]

5.23 Another factor that may help to explain such variations is the constraint placed upon colleges in the public sector, by their Articles of Government, in transferring sums of money approved in their financial estimates for one purpose to another purpose. The Weaver reforms permitted 'virement' to a limited extent, between defined heads of expenditure. It remained impossible, however, to transfer moneys voted for the employment of academic staff to the employment of non-academic or supporting staff. A highly favourable academic staff : student ratio may thus (in theory at least) conceal a poor level of secretarial and administrative support for academic staff, so that a higher proportion of academic staff time may be spent on low-level administration than is commonly the case in universities. Because all staff are appointed to the service of the LEA, its prior approval to appointment at a particular grade must be sought. Although the rules governing the remuneration of academic staff are nationally agreed, an LEA may in the appointment of non-academic staff often be concerned to ensure that anomalies are not created between their numbers and grades and those commonly found in other 'departments' of the LEA. What are thus essentially decisions with academic and educational implications may be taken for non-educational reasons. Oakes again sought a solution to the problem, recommending greater freedom for governing bodies in staffing matters (recommendations xiii (a) and xxiii (a)).

5.24 It may be argued that the local authority practice of budgeting for only one year ahead more easily permits expansion from one year to the next than does the traditional quinquennial system of financing the universities.[122] On the other hand, in conditions of economic restraint it also makes it more difficult for colleges to plan ahead. Thus, an LEA may be unwilling to sanction the appointment of additional members of staff in the course of an academic year, even if the sums required for the payment of their salaries are available in that year's budget. In the following year, with a permanent appointment, the full annual cost of the salary will be entered in the estimates, whereas, in the first year, only part of it may be incurrred. Such appointments, therefore, may be considered to have an in-built inflationary effect. Capital expenditure for building projects may also be deferred because of implications for subsequent

[121]This was done through the so-called Delany norms, which would have made the staff: student ratio (ssr) in polytechnics roughly similar to that in the university sector. They dealt, of course, with academic staff alone. By 1976, some polytechnics had an ssr of about 1:10, while one polytechnic still had an ssr of roughly 1:5. On the other hand, other factors may have contributed to this phenomenon, such as the varying success of colleges in attracting students to courses for which staff had already been provided. We may note here that CNAA will require that it be satisfied of the calibre of the staff who will run a new degree course before that degree course is actually offered.

[122]Cf. Lewis, P. (1971) *Higher Education Review*, Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 23–4.

recurrent expenditure, arising from staffing and maintenance, as well as from the charges incurred on the loans used to finance them. Here, a college is in a sense caught between the devil of DES, with its own programme of capital expenditure varying from year to year with the ups-and-downs of the national economy, and the deep blue sea of the LEA, with its eye upon the level of resources likely to be available to local authorities in the foreseeable future.

5.25 The imperfect predictability of permitted capital expenditure is a feature that public sector colleges have in common with the universities, and clearly it makes internal planning and management more difficult than it would be otherwise. The other weaknesses of the public sector's system of financing are theirs alone. From a management point of view, there may seem to be merit in the Oakes recommendation ii: that funds for recurrent expenditure should be allocated by a National Body, which would fix the sum available to a college on the basis of an examination of its academic provision and plans. The institution then presumably would be able to spend the sums allocated to it in accordance with its own changing priorities, as do the universities. Not only would such a system draw together academic planning and financial planning, in a way that the division between the responsibilities of the Academic Board and the governing body and local authority make at present more difficult, but it would also provide some guarantee of the future level of funding. Once the National Body had approved the development plans of a college, it would not be easy for it to renege on its commitment to finance the fulfilment of that plan, provided that the college had shown that it was capable of implementing it. This is indeed implicit in another Oakes recommendation (xvii (c)), that financial planning should be on the basis of rolling programmes. At the same time, the power of the National Body to advise the DES on the allocation of capital expenditure (recommendation ii), presumably in line with its own allocation of recurrent funds, might facilitate coherent academic and financial planning in the colleges.

EXTERNAL ACADEMIC CONTROLS AND THEIR INTERNAL EFFECT

5.26 We now examine the internal effect of external academic controls on public sector colleges. You have seen, from your reading of Regan and from section 4, how any proposal for a new course at higher-education level must be submitted by a college, through its LEA, to the RAC, and receive the approval of the RSI on behalf of the Secretary of State. It then passes to an external validating body, whether that be the CNAA, or BEC or TEC, or a professional institution, which passes judgement upon its educational quality and the human and physical resources available for running it successfully. Once again, the colleges are subject to external constraints unknown in the university sector. What concerns us here is the additional difficulty this imposes upon those involved in the internal planning and management of the institution, whether financial or academic. When course approval is uncertain, and its timing more uncertain still, forward planning has about it such unpredictability that it could encourage irresponsibility. Resources may be expended upon a course that will never receive approval, and it might seem wise to seek approval for more courses than the institution could reasonably hope to run, were all of them to receive approval simultaneously. That this does not happen more often is in part a consequence of the informal advice given by HMI—again an external agency.

5.27 We have said that the first of the principles found in university government, which we outlined in paragraph 5.17—that of government by committee—is now largely embodied in the government of public sector colleges. There can be no doubt, if we turn to the second principle we set out in that paragraph, that public sector institutions are subject to a much greater measure of external control than are universities, at least in respect of their educational provision. It may be argued that the pooling system gives them greater financial freedom than universities, but only if LEAs behave irresponsibly. But if a maintaining LEA takes seriously its duty to examine in detail and to control the estimates of its colleges, then here too the internal organs of government of the college have much less freedom than that exercised by those of a university.

5.28 Nor (the third principle we discovered in university government) are the academic staff of public sector colleges involved in policy-making at every level, because they cannot serve upon their maintaining LEA[123] or have a say in the decisions of external academic control.[124] It may be argued that, if public sector colleges are designed to respond to external social pressures and demands, this is a desirable system of government. That it is a different system of government, despite the Weaver reforms, there is no doubt. If the Oakes proposals were fully implemented the public sector model would be further assimilated to that of the universities. That any such assimilation should be thought desirable may be held to imply, if universities and other colleges are still held to be different types of organization with differing objectives (as in the Crosland thesis), that there has been some incoherence in the evolution of policy for higher education in Britain. It is to that question that we turn in the final section of this unit.

[123] This is because they are employees of that LEA.

[124] A few may enter the Inspectorate, but they cannot then remain college lecturers. Some, but a small proportion of the whole, will serve upon CNAA, TEC or BEC, or their committees.

6 Conclusions - and the future

A CATEGORIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

6.1 We referred in section 4 to the concept used by the Canadian, Howard Adelman, of a 'Social Service Station' and we applied it to the original conception of the polytechnics. Adelman, in fact, divides institutions of higher education into two broad categories, the Mission University and the Mirror University.[125] The Mission University 'provides society with a mature sense of values and a detached intelligence' and the Mirror University 'reflects the current values of society and entails an engaged intelligence'. He divides each category into two sub-categories. The Mission University is either a Sanctuary of Truth, 'an ivory tower to inculcate "character" ', or a Sanctuary of Method, 'characterized by professionalism to ensure standards are maintained not only in the method of preserving truth but also in the recognition of professional status based on training in that method'. The Mirror University is either a Social Service Station, which he describes as 'affluent and well supported by the political power', or a Culture-Mart, 'where increasingly the financial support comes from the students'.[126]

ITS APPLICATION TO BRITAIN

6.2 It does not matter for our purpose whether pure examples of Adelman's categories and sub-categories are to be found anywhere in the world, even in North America. The categorization nevertheless remains useful. Perhaps the nearest example we can find to a Sanctuary of Truth would be a well-endowed Oxbridge college, where all or nearly all the students are studying the traditional arts disciplines or pure science—that is, where the institution is concerned with the accumulation of data and theories *ad infinitum*, for their own sake, and with their transmission to students. This objective has little to do with the subsequent employment of the students, even if some of the teachers take an incidental interest in that. In the Sanctuary of Method, 'scientific' method becomes an end in itself in all disciplines, so that standards may be maintained. We may instance parts of some of the great civic universities—such as the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology. Here, vocationalism is of some importance, but purely at the level of the higher professions, and is concerned with the maintenance of standards within them.

6.3 With the Mirror University, on the other hand, external objectives are dominant, and they are related directly to the requirements of the society in which the university is set. The Social Service Station provides the manpower that the political authorities of the country (or of a sub-division of it) think are necessary to the growth of the economy, and to the development of public services. It is concerned with a wider group than the higher professions, and the bias of its teaching will be towards practical skill rather than theoretical knowledge: pure vocationalism would be the dominant ethic. The Culture-Mart 'gives the dominant middle bourgeois class a common language and a sense of values to confirm its destiny to rule'.[127] If the polytechnics, in their original conception, and the old colleges of education were essentially Social Service Stations, then 'the general arts' sections of some of the new

[125]The Adelman categorization may be seen by students as reflecting the conflicting demands made on academics and the institutions in which they work. Cf. the argument in paragraph 5.4.

[126]Adelman, H (1973), pp. 44–5.

[127]Ibid, p. 45. If we may take such institutions in post-war Britain as an example, they also enable members of the lower middle class (and a few from the working class) to join the 'dominant middle bourgeois class', and acquire its sense of values.

colleges of higher education are perhaps good examples of the Culture-Mart. So also are Oxford and Cambridge, despite their role as Sanctuaries of Truth, since there is no doubt that they have provided for the last century at least a high proportion of the senior ranks of the Civil Service and of the country's dominant financial institutions. Perhaps the perfect example of a Mirror University is the Open University: some of its students approach it as a Social Service Station, not least those students who wish to convert a certificate of education into a degree, thus making them perhaps better and certainly higher-paid teachers, while others, especially the older student who will gain no advantage from an Open University qualification, approach it as a Culture-Mart.

6.4 This categorization is instructive. If we can imagine a pure Sanctuary of Truth, then there seems no good reason why it should ever change in response to external pressures; as a research institution, it is concerned only with the elaboration of new theories and the discovery of new information, whether or not those theories and that information have any practical application; as a teaching institution it is concerned only with the transmission of those theories and that information to its students. Its funding may be either public or private, or a mixture of the two, depending upon what value public authorities and private charities place upon the maintenance and the elaboration of 'the truth'. If you turn back to the characterization of the British university as an organization which we gave in paragraph 5.1, you will see that no British university conforms exactly to this model. All, or parts of all, are responsive to external pressure.

6.5 There would seem no good reason why a Sanctuary of Method should not be funded by the higher professions, by those who employ those qualified in those professions, and again, of course, by public authorities—dependent upon what value public authorities set upon an adequate supply of manpower professionally qualified. It would seem rational that a Social Service Station should be funded entirely by public authorities, whose primary interest it is to ensure that there is an adequate flow of manpower to maintain economic growth and adequate public services. On the other hand, as Adelman himself suggests, a Culture-Mart could well in part or in whole be funded by the students themselves, whether through their own contributions or through those of their parents or other relations, or through those of private institutions or of Government passing through the students' hands—i.e. by the fee-paying system. The students are buying (or are having bought for them) their future place in society.

6.6 Equally it might seem reasonable that a Sanctuary of Truth should be an entirely self-governing institution, with even the internal allocation of finance being controlled entirely by the academic members of the institution. A Sanctuary of Method might reasonably have upon its governing council representatives of the professional and employing bodies that it served. In a Social Service Station one would expect to see control by external bodies, not least public authorities, and a hierarchical system of internal government, in order to ensure that the precise wishes of those external clients were met. In a Culture-Mart, one might rationally look for government by staff and students together, so as to ensure that student wishes were satisfied wherever that was academically and educationally practicable.

6.7 In Britain, no institution of higher education is financed exactly according to any of these methods and none is governed exactly according to any of these methods. All receive the greatest part of their funding from public sources, although by two distinct methods: UGC financing, and the local authority pooling system. They receive private aid—whether from charities or from professional bodies or from research foundations—in varying degrees, Oxford and Cambridge receiving most. All receive a substantial part of their income

from student fees, although the bulk of this comes indirectly from public sources, because students in receipt of mandatory grant from their local authorities automatically have their fees paid.

6.8 None is self-governing, in the sense of being controlled purely by the academic staff of the institution itself. Some universities have Councils dominated by academic members, with representatives of the professional institutions and employers—but all include some other 'lay' members whose presence would be hard to explain in terms of the pure theory of the Sanctuary of Method. There is no pure Culture-Mart, governed by staff and students together without external intervention, and, if we take the polytechnics as a model of the Social Service Station in British higher education, their system of government is a mixture of some internal academic control by the staff of the institution, and external control, partly by the public authorities, whose demands they in theory satisfy, and partly by other bodies (such as the CNAA). The implementation of the Oakes Report, by including 'academic' members on the proposed National Body (or Advanced Further Education Council), would import further features of the government appropriate to the Mission University into that of the Social Service Station.

LACK OF A COHERENT BRITISH THEORY

6.9 In short, British higher education lacks a coherent theory upon which financing and government systems might be based. The 'binary' division does not mark off two sharply distinct types of institution, save in respect of their financing and government. If we look rather at their objectives and purposes,[128] then institutions on each side of the 'binary' divide heavily overlap. Thus, one test of the embodiment of the Social Service concept in an institution's objectives might seem to be the degree to which it places its expertise at the disposal of outside bodies. In the early 1970s, every British polytechnic had an Industrial Liaison Officer, whose principal duty was to advise local firms and to give them access to more sophisticated advice within or outside the higher education system. But several British universities also had such officers. One British university has a centre for industrial innovation, and four universities have centres for tribology.[129] It is common for such centres to derive much of their income from sources other than the UGC, whether it comes from government departments (e.g. the Department of Industry) or directly from industry, as payment for services rendered. Both sectors of British higher education conduct research which is funded by industry directly.

6.10 In other ways, also, the autonomous sector embodies elements of the Mirror University. The extra-mural departments of British universities offer courses which in general are cultural rather than vocational, professional or purely academic in content. That is to say, they embody the Culture-Mart approach. The education departments of universities, by contrast, are a pure example of the Social Service Station concept.

6.11 The confusion in the development of policy for British higher education is well instanced by the recommendations of the 1972 White Paper,[130] and by DES circular 7/73 and its implementation. Paragraph 152 of the 1972 White Paper suggested that some colleges of education might merge with universities, although more would merge with polytechnics or other FE colleges. Even

[128]Which are reflected in *process*, the methods used in teaching and other activities, and in their *content*.

[129]The science and technology of interacting surfaces in relative motion (and the practices related thereto), including the subjects of friction, lubrication and wear (*Chambers Dictionary of Science and Technology*).

[130]Department of Education and Science (1972a) *Education: a framework for expansion*, pp. 17 and 18.

colleges that did not merge with universities might seek validation of their awards from a neighbouring university rather than from the CNAA, which served the rest of the public sector. Neither document makes it clear whether the Government thought that the objectives of a college that merged with a university should be thought different from those of another joining the FE system. If they do not differ, it is clear that there can be no fundamental differences of orientation between the two sectors.

6.12 One commentator has written 'The same administrative set-up cannot be successful for two types of institution which have very different goals.'[131] It would seem to follow that different administrative set-ups cannot be recommended for types of institutions that have the same goals. Yet that is exactly what the development of British higher education over several decades has produced.

HOW HAS POLICY EVOLVED?

6.13 Is there any rationale for this phenomenon? In other words, can we explain how the CATs were designated, in 1956, to develop technological education, and became universities in the mid-1960s; how the polytechnics were designated in 1966, for much the same purpose, but given an internal structure of government based largely on that of universities; how the recommendations of McNair and Robbins that the colleges of education should be integrated into the university sector were disregarded, but by 1972 some colleges were encouraged to merge with universities; how the 'socially responsive' polytechnics were allowed to develop pure arts degrees; how the Oakes Committee could recommend that local authority institutions should have their finance in essence determined by a national committee—and a whole host of other questions? Can we explain how the vocationalism of the 1966 White Paper[132] became translated into the 'relevance' of the 1972 White Paper, which suggested that most students of higher education should follow courses that would help them to cope with the problems facing them in their personal, social and working lives[133]—a much broader approach?

6.14 To the present writer there seem to be several explanations. First (and the simplest explanation), fashions change: by 1972, there was much more interest in the health and the extension of democracy than there was in 1966, as well as a concern about increasing disorder (even vandalism) in society. Second, and much more important, the dominant principle in the development of post-war British higher education has been what has come to be known as 'the Robbins principle'—that places in higher education must be provided for all who are qualified for them and seek them (see Unit 7). Third, as a corollary of the second principle, and as a consequence of the difficulty of expanding or contracting the universities too rapidly (they are autonomous), there must be a 'concertina' sector that can be expanded or contracted as occasion demands—namely, the public sector. Fourth, because the application of a straightforward university system of financing and government to that sector would make it as difficult to control closely as the autonomous sector itself, it must be subject to a measure of direct public control exercised by both DES and by local authorities. Fifth, local authorities must always have a say in higher education, not only to meet local need but to placate them at times when other central government policies might offend them. Sixth, a sufficient proportion of vocational and professional courses must be located in the public sector to ensure that there is always an

[131] Lewis, P. (1971) *Higher Education Review*, Vol. 3, no. 3.

[132] Department of Education and Science (1966) *A Plan for Polytechnics and other Colleges*.

[133] Department of Education and Science (1972a) *Education: a framework for expansion*, paragraph 160.

adequate, or a not more than adequate (cf. teacher education) supply of trained manpower for the public service and the needs of the economy. Seventh, the pull of the university model of government must, by virtue of the other principles, always be resisted, but it must never by resisted to the point where excessive discontent in the public sector might impair its efficiency (see the Weaver Report of 1966 and the Oakes Report of 1978). We do not suggest that these have been 'principles' of policy-making in the sense that they have been consciously enunciated. Rather, they seem to have been the unconscious concerns of British policy-makers over two decades.[134]

THE FUTURE

6.15 All of these 'principles' may be subsumed under the heading of empiricism. Even the central principle (the second), that places must be found in higher education for all qualified for them and seeking them, is in a way empirical, since it is not related to any concept of national need. It is that principle that is the starting point of the DES consultation document *Higher Education into the 1990s*, published in 1978.[135] Because of the decline in the number of live births from 1965 onwards, all the projections of demand for higher education by 18-year-olds show a decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s. On the other hand, demand seemed in 1978 likely to peak in the early to mid-1980s. This posed the question whether places should be provided for peak demand, leaving spare capacity thereafter, or whether the Robbins principle should be abandoned.

6.16 The document set out several policy options, of which the most interesting is the fifth, which postulated an increase in demand from working-class students (hitherto a small proportion of those seeking higher education, and recently a declining proportion) and an increase in demand by mature students. If these increases in demand in the late 1980s could be assumed, then it would be possible to provide places for the years of peak demand, in the expectation that these places would subsequently be filled by new categories of student, as well as by the traditional categories. What is significant here is that the serious consideration of policies to encourage working class students to remain in full-time education until the age of eighteen and then to enter higher education,[136] and that of policies to permit the participation of a higher number of mature students in higher education,[137] seems from the document to have followed merely from the statistical demonstration that there might either be an excess of demand over places in the early 1980s, or an excess of places over demand in the early 1990s (the two propositions are the same).

6.17 This is empiricism elevated into a principle. It is at this point that we touch upon the subject-matter of the next unit. If more mature students are to be attracted into higher education, does that not imply a change in the traditional concept of adult education in Britain — namely, non-vocational or liberal education of adults, in general leading to no qualification? The Open University has already made a dent in that system, since it offers a qualification, which may have vocational value. Technically, it is not part of 'adult education', as traditionally defined. If, however, all adults are to be encouraged to participate in continuing education and training, at all levels, some of them proceeding to higher education, then we have a very different

[134]With part of the argument here, cf. Trow, M. (1969) *Higher Education Review*, Vol. 2, no. 1.

[135]Department of Education and Science (1978a) *Higher Education into the 1990s: a discussion document*.

[136]For example, the provision of a universal system of educational maintenance allowances for the 16s to 18s.

[137]For example, paid educational leave for all workers, with entitlement building up over time.

system from that which we have known traditionally. Education is no longer 'end-on' to working life, but may be interpolated throughout working life, and even into retirement. As *Higher Education into the 1990s* reveals, policy makers in Britain have as yet scarcely come to grips with the implications of the concept of continuing or recurrent education.[138] It says:

> This prospect needs to be viewed in the perspective of continuous social, economic and technological change, which may demand more emphasis on continued education, and may be accompanied by changes in patterns of employment or of unemployment.
>
> (Department of Education and Science (1968))

That may seem a glimpse of the obvious—but at least it demonstrates that the empirical tradition of policy-making for higher education continues, and is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.

6.18 You should now return to the questions that we asked at the end of section 1; you will find that the last of these, question vi, has been partially answered in the last paragraph. The answer that the present author would give to the other questions is implicit in the last five sections of this unit. You must, however, make up your own mind about the proper answers to them. In so complex a field as the development of higher education in Britain, it is the task of any teacher to set out to analyse historic policies, but not to provide alternatives to them.

[138]Recurrent education is a strategy for the achievement of continuing or life-long education, implying the alternation of periods of work and regularly renewed education or training.

Appendix 1
Author's comments on activities

Activity 1

You could have listed many changes of policy, of which the following are examples:

(a) The designation of CATs in 1956.

(b) The elevation of CATs to university status, by steps, between 1962 and 1966.

(c) The foundation of seven new universities in the early 1960s.

(d) The designation of thirty polytechnics in 1966, and the decision that they should never become universities.

(e) The merger of the former Colleges of Education with universities, polytechnics or CFEs, beginning in 1972 and still not completed when this unit was written.

(f) The mid-1970s change in the curriculum of teacher education, which meant that students could defer their final course decision in some cases until they had completed a DipHE.

(g) The extension of the principle of automatic student grant to cover those admitted to the long-term residential colleges of adult education.

(h) The foundation in 1969 of the Open University.

You may find other examples.

Activity 2

(a) The ATOs had confused boundaries and did not include all universities and polytechnics. They had no jurisdiction over university departments of education. The National Advisory Council provided little effective national coordination of their activities (and there was none at all, except by DES, after it was abolished).

(b) James proposed that there should be three cycles in the education and training of teachers—personal education, full-time professional training followed by a period of probation when teaching in schools, and in-service education and training. There should be new regional councils for teacher education and training, known as RCCDEs,[139] including all universities, polytechnics, colleges and LEAs in the region. Finally, there should be a new National Council for Teacher Education and Training (NCTET), comprised of nominees of the RCCDEs appointed by the Secretary of State.

(c) Many believed that the James proposals did not offer the prospect of all-graduate entry to the profession (a long-standing demand of the National Union of Teachers), rejecting the two-year DipHE as the equivalent of a graduate qualification, and it was believed that teachers might enter the profession, drawing a full teacher's salary, who were not fully qualified. It was also felt that the NCTET should not be appointed by the Secretary of State on the basis of nominations, but should be directly nominated by the variety of educational interests in the country. Many, and not least those teaching in the colleges of education, also argued that it was unwise to create a totally separate sector of teacher education, separate above all from the universities, and the universities themselves rejected the new DipHE as an inferior form of higher education.

(d) The Government concluded that there should be all-graduate entry to the teaching profession, but that the degree should not be on the recommended James pattern, students following instead a concurrent pattern of education and training, with the possibility of an extra year's study to convert an ordinary BEd degree into an honours degree. New teachers should undergo a period of induction when they started teaching, after which they would be given registered status, but at the outset of which they would be recognized as qualified teachers. Finally, the Government announced its desire to combine the former colleges of education with the polytechnics and other institutions offering courses of advanced further education, to

[139]Regional Councils for Colleges and Departments of Education.

form a coherent public (i.e. non-university) sector of higher education, giving detailed indications somewhat later of how this was to be done, in DES Circular 7/73.

(e) The new Labour Government of 1974 announced a year later that the ATOs were to disappear and were to be replaced by new regional coordinating machinery for the in-service education and training of teachers, and the coordination of induction and teaching practice.[140] Many colleges were to merge with polytechnics or universities or further education colleges, some of them forming a new breed of colleges of higher education, with only part of their work concerned with teacher education.[141]

(f) Local authorities exercise very little control over their colleges of education, except that they own the colleges and therefore cannot be compelled by the Department of Education and Science to use them for a purpose of which they do not approve. They do not have much say in the appointment of staff within the budget set for the college. The budget itself is determined largely by staffing norms and controls over capital expenditure exercised by the DES, as well as by the Instrument and Articles of Government, which require approval by the Secretary of State.

(g) Voluntary colleges of education are financed by the Department of Education and Science through grants for current and for capital expenditure. Local authority colleges are financed from a 'pool', which is administered nationally on the advice of a Pooling Committee composed largely of representatives of the local authority associations, so that all local authorities pay for what each local authority 'maintaining' a college spends.[142]

(h) The initiative for new courses comes from the colleges themselves, although the approval of such courses is closely controlled by the Department of Education and Science through the Inspectorate, as well as by regional machinery. The colleges are responsible for their own internal teaching arrangements. On the other hand, the validation of their courses and the approval of their budgets rest with external agencies, so their autonomy is very limited.

[140]This intention was subsequently modified in the light of the recommendations of the Oakes Committee (see paragraphs 4.33 ff).

[141]Regan is here out of date. Mergers of colleges with universities, polytechnics, FE colleges or other colleges of education proceeded apace in the mid-1970s (see paragraph 1.17), so that by 1979 one no longer could speak helpfully of a separate teacher education sector of higher education.

[142]Regan notes the change in the formula by which local-authority contributions are assessed.

In 1975, the Teacher Training Pool was merged with that for Advanced Further Education. The compromise formula for local-authority contributions takes some account of the rateable value of industrial and commercial property in an authority's area (31 per cent), as well as of its share of the national school population (69 per cent); see paragraph 4.32.

Appendix 2
Extract from the Oakes Report [143]

Conclusions and Summary of Recommendations

13.1. In previous chapters we have dealt with various facets of the matters we were commissioned to examine. Before summarising our recommendations it may be helpful if we add some comments to help them to be seen as an articulated whole and mention one or two matters which have an important bearing on our remit.

13.2. Education has been described as a national service locally administered. Its national character is nowhere more marked than in higher education. This is reflected in our recommendation for a National Body charged with advising on the total resources to be made available for maintained higher education and responsible for effectively determining the allocation of national funds between authorities and institutions. It should be seen as a body exercising considerable authority.

13.3. At the same time, our recommendations reflect our desire to see a large measure of responsibility and initiative at local level. There are therefore important limits to the powers of the National Body. It could neither require nor forbid an institution or authority to make any higher education provision or to incur any particular expenditure. Its influence will derive from its responsibility for allocating the funds which local authorities provide collectively and for overseeing their effective use.

13.4. We regard our recommendation that individual maintaining authorities should directly meet part of the cost of the higher education they provide as an essential corollary to the responsibility they would exercise. It is not merely a financial incentive to prudent management but the counterpart of a degree of freedom from absolute control, a freedom which we think is essential to the welfare of the maintained system.

13.5. Our recommendations as to how management functions at the local level should be discharged reflect this same concern to ensure that management and financial responsibilities are delegated not only to local authorities but also downwards to governing bodies, principals, heads of department and other staff. Our recommendations for the carrying forward of savings are put forward not only as an incentive to prudent management but because we believe that initiative and responsibility at any level can only be fostered if there is some source of funds, however small, within the control of management at that level.

13.6. Our recommendations for new regional advisory councils envisage that they should be financed by their member authorities. This reflects our view that they should not be regarded as regional branches of the National Body but as bodies established by local education authorities in a region to enable them better to discharge their own functions. Their responsibility will be to their parent authorities to whom their advice will normally be directed.

[143]Department of Education and Science (1978) *Report of the Working Group on the Management of Higher Education in the Maintained Sector*, Cmnd 7130, London, HMSO (The Oakes Report) pp. 54–60. Reproduced by permission of the Controller of HM Stationery Office.

13.7. Throughout our discussions we have kept much in mind the existence of an important direct grant sector of higher education. This has a long history of close working with local education authorities. We wish this to continue and we would regret it if one outcome of our recommendations for better management of the maintained sector were to leave direct grant institutions with a sense of isolation. But it is not within our terms of reference to make recommendations in relation to them, and we have refrained from so doing. We believe, however, that if it were the wish of the providing bodies that they should be either associated with or come within the system of national management we propose there would be a ready response from the maintained side. We hope that the Secretary of State will canvass the possibilities of such steps in the consultations which she has undertaken to make on our report.

13.8. We believe that our recommendations for better management will benefit both the availability and quality of maintained higher education. Our assumption has been that standards will continue to be a matter for academic boards, validating bodies and professional institutions. But we recognise that standards are intimately linked to management and financial decisions. Our proposals for the composition of the National Body reflect our concern with the maintenance of standards. We believe that because of this, and because the councils of validating bodies also include representatives from the local education authority world, there is no need to fear that the actions of the National Body in promoting proper economy will be threatening to educational quality. Where necessary the National Body should stand ready to enter into discussion with validating bodies about standards.

13.9. We have placed much emphasis on the need for higher education to be adaptable to the changes which we expect may be required of it in the period up to the end of the century. The terms and conditions of service of academic and other staff will need to reflect this and we hope that the bodies responsible for negotiating them will keep this in view.

13.10. Finally, we recognise that all of us have as the result of our discussions changed our initial views and come closer to the views expressed by others. We believe that our recommendations represent an important step forward towards more rational and effective management of higher education and as such commend them for implementation at an early date. They are as follows:

General

(i) Since there will be a continuing substantial local authority role in providing higher education, the system for its management should reflect a partnership between national and local levels. (3.2, 4.8 and 5.4).

National

(ii) A National Body should be established with the following terms of reference:

'To collect, analyse and present, where appropriate in conjunction with the Department of Education and Science and the University Grants Committee, information affecting the demand for and supply of higher education in the maintained sector; to advise the Secretary of State and the local authority associations on the total provision which should be made for it; to consider and issue guidance on the programmes and estimates submitted to it by authorities and, where appropriate, institutions; to allocate funds for recurrent expenditure and to advise on the allocation of capital expenditure; and to have general oversight of the development of maintained higher education and its cost-effectiveness. (5.2)

(iii) The National Body should be composed as follows:

Independent Chairman		1
Local Authority Members (to be nominated by the local authority associations)		8–9
Institutional Interests (to be nominated by		8
NATFHE	3	
CDP	2	
The Secretary of State	3)	
Others (to be nominated by the Secretary of State)		8–10
		25–28 (6.3)

(iv) The Secretary of State should consult widely in making her nominations, and in the case of the three institutional members for whose nomination she would be responsible should consider names suggested by organisations representing management and staff in maintained institutions providing higher education. There should also be consultations between her and nominating bodies before they take their final decisions. (6.4 and 6.6)

(v) Members should serve in a personal capacity and appointment should be for a fixed period renewable. The Secretary of State and organisations nominating members should also be able to nominate a strictly limited number of other persons to receive papers and to serve as alternates. (6.3 and 6.10)

(vi) The DES should be represented at meetings of the National Body by assessors. (6.3)

(vii) The National Body should employ its own staff. (6.11)

(viii) The position of the local authorities in relation to the National Body should be reflected in a special procedure whereby if the local authority members present were united on an issue but in a minority on the National Body, the matter could be referred at their request to the Secretary of State for decision in consultation with the local authority associations. (6.8–6.9)

(ix) The funds under the control of the National Body should be provided by local authorities collectively through a pool. (5.22) They should meet the major part of the cost of providing higher education in the maintained sector. (5.11) Maintaining authorities should, however, be responsible for meeting directly up to 15 per cent of the costs of their higher education provision; this direct local contribution should be introduced at a level of 5 per cent and increased by annual stages up to 15 per cent, subject to review before going beyond 10 per cent. (5.38)

(x) The Pooling Committee should be invited to study alternative formulae for determing contributions to the pool and possible transitional adjustments designed to mitigate difficulties arising from the introduction of local contributions. (5.37)

(xi) The National Body's remit should extend to all forms of maintained higher education and it will have to develop a variety of administrative and financial mechanisms appropriate to varying types of institution and provision. We have considered certain possibilities but the National Body should be free to make the final choice, in consultation with the local authority associations and other interested organisations. (7.2–7.3)

Local

(xii) Individual maintaining authorities should retain overall responsibility for the good management of institutions under their control. (8.1) Subject to this, institutions should be granted the maximum freedom to manage their own affairs. (8.3)

(xiii) The governing body of an institution should provide a clear focus of authority and accountability. (8.5) In particular,

(a) it should be accorded the greatest practicable degree of operational freedom in matters relating to the appointment of all grades of staff; (8.6)

(b) it should in general be free to make its own arrangements regarding purchases and contracts; and (8.12)

(c) its ultimate responsibility to its maintaining authority for all expenditure incurred by the institution should be clearly recognised. (8.20)

(xiv) Provision should be made whereby a governing body which fails to fulfil its responsibilities could be dissolved and arrangements made for the discharge of its functions pending the establishment of a new governing body. (8.13)

(xv) Although the business of the governing body should be entrusted to a clerk reponsible directly to it, the chief education officer of the maintaining authority should have the right to attend and speak at all meetings. (8.5)

(xvi) The constitution and modus operandi of the governing body should ensure

(a) continuity of membership among non-staff members to enable them to acquire an adequate understanding of the institution's work;

(b) the association of members with specific areas of the institution's work, eg through finance committees and joint planning committees with the academic board; and

(c) a reasonable overall balance in membership between representatives of the maintaining authority, representatives of interests within the institution itself and independent members. (8.21)

(xvii) Rules governing finance should ensure

(a) the provision of funds by the maintaining authority in the form of a closed budget, with supplementation only on the basis of predetermined rules;

(b) the carry-over by the institution from one financial year to the next of at least part of any savings made through effective management; and

(c) the operation of financial planning and control on the basis of rolling programmes. (8.14)

(xviii) Clear and detailed financial regulations should be drawn up by maintaining authorities governing their relations with their institutions. (8.16)

(xix) The academic board should have access to relevant financial information to enable it to assess the financial implications of its decisions on academic matters; conversely, the governing body should take into account the advice of the academic board regarding the academic implications of financial decisions. (8.24)

(xx) The principal as chairman of the academic board should have a major responsibility for ensuring harmonious relations between the latter and the governing body. (8.25)

(xxi) Those responsible for day-to-day management of the institution should be adequately represented on its governing body and academic board. (8.26)

(xxii) Responsibility for the formulation of guidance on articles of government and for their approval should remain with the Secretary of State, who should, however, look to the National Body for advice. (8.29)

(xxiii) The National Body should have a general responsibility for improving the management of maintained higher education as a whole. In addition to preparing advice on articles of government, it should promote further consideration of

(a) the extent to which governing bodies can be given greater authority in establishment matters, and

(b) the preparation of model financial regulations for adoption by LEAs. (8.10, 8.16 and 8.30)

(xxiv) Further consideration should be given in the appropriate quarters to the responsibility of governing bodies for approving student union fees and to the provisions of the Burnham FE Document affecting the management structure of institutions. (8.17)

Regional

(xxv) Nine new regional advisory councils should be established in England, with responsibility for considering, promoting, monitoring and advising on the planning, coordination and development in the regions of higher education in the public sector, including initial, induction and in-service training of teachers. Universities in each region should be invited to cooperate with these new councils and to be represented on them. (9.12–9.13)

(xxvi) The councils should be set up by trust deeds, requiring the establishment of a governing body, together with two main sub-committees to deal with

(a) higher education, including initial teacher education, and

(b) the induction and in-service training of teachers. (9.16)

(xxvii) Initially, the boundaries of each region should be those of the existing RACs; modifications of these boundaries, where necessary, and arrangements for membership in areas of overlap should be the subject of negotiation between the councils as soon as they are established. (9.14)

(xxviii) Each council should have a governing body composed of three broad groups, comprising

(a) representatives of local education authorities and voluntary providing bodies;

(b) representatives of staff and management in the institutions, and

(c) others, including representatives of commerce and industry, schools and the universities. (9.15)

(xxix) Members of Her Majesty's Inspectorate should attend meetings of the councils as assessors. (9.15)

(xxx) The constitution of the governing body of each council should be subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. (9.15)

(xxxi) The budget of each council should be met from the funds of the constituent local authorities. (9.17)

Wales

(xxxii) The application of the recommendations in this report to Wales should be considered further in relation to the timing of devolution. (11.3)

Implementation

(xxxiii) The DES should consult further with the other Departments concerned and with the local authority associations about the legislation which may be required to implement these recommendations. (12.3)

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(xxxiv) Consideration should be given, in the light of the prospective parliamentary timetable, to the establishment of the National Body on a shadow basis to undertake preparatory work pending the enactment of legislation. (12.7)

(xxxv) There should be an early start on the implementation of our recommendations. (12.4) In particular, steps should be taken urgently, if necessary before final decisions are taken on the other recommendations, to establish the new regional advisory councils (recommendation (xxv)) (12.6) and to initiate the discussions referred to in recommendations (xi) and (xxiii) (12.5). The DES should assume responsibility for the last, pending establishment of the National Body. (8.30)

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